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Preface 
 
As I started working with this paper a series of difficult choices had to be made. The 
most difficult choices revolved around what processes had the greatest effect on the 
Commission `s resignation, but also what theoretical contributions could best shed 
light on these processes. The advice I was given from various people reflected their 
personal interests and therefore varied greatly. It was impossible to make everybody 
happy. Finally I got Professor Morten Egeberg as my tutor, and as you can see this 
paper was completed with his help. 
From a personal viewpoint I hope this paper will serve as a contribution to the debate 
about what the European Union is. I also hope that this paper will inspire my nephew 
Tobias to learn as much as possible throughout his life. 
 
To Tobias. 
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 Chapter 1. 
1.1. Introduction 
 
The Commission of the European Union resigned on March 15 1999 after a long 
process of turmoil. This had never happened before and the resignation and the process 
leading up to this event were extensively covered in the media. They often described 
the situation as a major crisis for the European Union (EU) as an institution. Some 
pointed out that this could be the start of something new, the start of an even stronger 
institution. What triggered this massive interest of the European Union was a whole 
range of issues in which funds were allegedly missing, misappropriated or badly 
mismanaged all entangled. Some events stood out and seemed to have an affect on the 
Commissions resignation. One of the things that attracted people `s attention was the 
alleged missing funds that was originally assigned to the European Communities 
Humanitarian Office (ECHO). ECHO was a unit that was created to deal with 
humanitarian crisis and improve the co-ordination of humanitarian aid funded by the 
EU. They were also suppose to make EU `s humanitarian aid more visible.  
The Great Lakes Region in Africa, especially Rwanda and also formed Yugoslavia 
were targeted as important area were human suffering would have to be relived.  
According to the Commissions Unit for the Co-ordination to Fight Against Fraud 
(UCLAF) something went terrible wrong and 500.000 ECU went missing. As a result 
of UCLAF `investigation they claimed that these money was embezzled through a firm 
called SSS Limited in Luxembourg, controlled by a EU official.1 
 
My working thesis is that the Commission `s resignation was the result of a series of 
actions, which is manifested in three processes: 
1. The process of UCLAF 
2. The process of ECHO and  
3. A third process with three links: 3:A: A refusal to give discharge for the budget 
of 1996, 3:B Motion of Censures and 3:C The Committee of Independent 
Experts. 
                                                 
1 Bulletin Quotidien Europe No 7300 Mon/ Tuesday 14/15 September 1998 page 16. 
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These actions in these processes could have been influenced by EU `s structure, more 
specifically the element of sector organisation in the European Union. I also think that 
the actions were influenced by the evolving party system in the European Union. 
 
My goal is to explain the Commission `s resignation. In order to do so I have chosen 
theories such as Liberal Intergovernmentalism and Neo Institutionalism. I think these 
theoretical contributions can shed some light over process number 1 and 2 that runs 
parallel and that triggers process number 3:A, B and C leading to the Commission `s 
resignation, but also place this case in a broader context. It will place this case in a 
theoretical debate about what the EU is. There is a contrast between these two 
descriptions of the EU. The Liberal Intergovernmental view would outline the EU as 
an international institution functioning merely as a tool in the hands of utility 
maximising nation states2 and were authority is given to the institution only to increase 
efficiency by the Member States.  
A Neo Institutional view would emphasise EU3 autonomy and the institutions own 
ability to influence the decision made. It focuses on how integrated the EU4is; 
What actually happens when the system in the EU is integrated? Is the significance of 
territorial units reduced?5 If so, what is replacing their significance? What units are 
then more important? Perhaps units organized according to criteria such as sector and 
party lines?6 
 
                                                 
2 I have used the work of Andrew Moravcsik representing the Liberal Intergovernmental 
view. Moravcsik, A. (1993): “Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal 
Intergovernmentalist Approach”, Journal of Common Market Studies 31:473-524  
3 Representing Neo Institutionalism I have used Johan P. Olsen `s work (1992): “Analysing 
Institutional Dynamics”, Staatswissenschaften und Staatspraxis 3:247-271  
4 As another representative of Neo Institutionalism I have selected the work of Morten 
Egeberg (2001): The Organisational Dimension of Integration in the EU (and Elsewhere). 
5  “The extent to which sub-territories are politically integrated into a larger system is 
reflected in the extent to which the interests of these sub-territories are expressed 
organisationally at the centre. Thus, in a highly integrated political system, non-territorial 
principles of organisational specialisation have taken clear precedence over the territorial 
principle at the centre.” Egeberg 2001:4   
6 Egeberg 2001:3-5 
 6
My aim is clear: To explain the resignation of the Commission as a result of a 
process manifested in processes 1, 2 and 3: A, B and C, by the use of Neo 
Institutional- and Liberal Intergovernmental lenses.  
 
 
1.2. Liberal Intergovernmentalism. 
 
Andrew Moravscik argues that EC has developed through a series of celebrated 
intergovernmental bargains, each of which set the agenda for an intervening period of 
consolidation. If one is to explain European Integration theoretically, it is of utmost 
importance to explain intergovernmental bargains.7  
To explain these bargains, Moravcsik focuses on three central issues: The assumption 
of rational state behaviour, a liberal theory of national preference formation, and a 
intergovernmentalist analysis of interstate negotiation.8  
 
Lets start with the assumption of rationality. 
States are perceived as rational actors. This basically means that all states are 
identifying what their interests are and they want to maximise their interests. They 
would evaluate their options and chose the alternative they think will maximise their 
interests. They could for instance chose to compete with other nation states or chose to 
co-operate to ensure that their interests are realised. Realists9 assume that the interests 
of nation states are fixed on maximising their wealth, security or power. But the nation 
states have different sets of resources to fight for their interests, which explain why 
some succeed in maximising their interests, while others fail. 
                                                 
7 Moravcsik 1993 
8 Moravcsik 1993:480 
9 Stanley Hoffman depicts the nature of international relations as nations or groups of nations 
competing for power, influence, prestige and ideas. International relationships take form of a 
hierarchy of the strong and the weak. Those on top at the hierarchy want to preserve their 
positions and those at the bottom want to rise. The key issue is the fight to be in command. 
Journal of Common Market Studies. Vol.3 No 2/1963 “The European Process at Atlantic 
Crosspurposes.” 
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However, Moravcsik disagrees with the assumption that a nation state `s preference is 
set in advance. According to him, nation states want to maximise their interests on the 
international arena, but the nation states` preferences are domestically defined. 
Moravcsik bases his assumption on how nation states` preferences are formed on 
liberal theory. In this line of thought the interests of a nation state are constantly being 
revitalised and altered by different actors within the nation state. The actors on a 
national level are individuals or voluntary associations. There is a constant battle 
between the different actors. 
They represent different identities and interests. Their interests will vary according to 
which policy area is in question. Meaning foreign policy that will inflict costs on their 
group they will oppose and policy coordination that will benefit their group they will 
support. If the cost or benefit is easily identified, they will fight harder. 
However, the actor `s power within the nation state, meaning their ability to force their 
will on others, varies. The resourcefulness of the different actors will vary and 
therefore their ability to be successful will vary. Hence, in this constant battle, some 
win and some loos. The winners gets to channel their interests as the interest of the 
executive branch `s interests. The winners define their interests as the interest of the 
nation state. Therefore the executive branch can be seen as an agent for the principals. 
The principal is the social group that managed to get their interest as the nation state `s 
interests.  
 
After the domestic struggle is over and one social group has won the battle, the 
national preferences are set. This means that the nation state `s preferences do not 
change. As it is time for the second step, the actors, meaning the nation states, have 
already made up their minds. They know what their interests are.  
If the nation state is for policy co-ordination, the Foreign Ministry will act to fulfil 
these preferences. They will take the aggregated interests up to the next level, meaning 
the international level and negotiate with other countries.10  
                                                 
10 Moravcsik refers back to the work of Roger Putnam: “Diplomacy and domestic politics: 
The Logic of two-level games” were Putnam argues: ”The politics of many international 
negotiations can usefully be conceived as a two-level game. At the national level, domestic 
groups pursue their interests by pressuring the government to adopt favourable policies, and 
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They will be agents to their national principal. They attend the negotiations on behalf 
of the nation state and they seek to make the nation state `s interests real.  
The actor chose to co-operate with other nation states because they believe they are 
able to get their interests through in the forum of an institution. 
Their task is to increase the likelihood of the nation `s goals being reached.  
Policy co-ordination will enable them to reach goals they cant reach on their own.  
Policy co-ordination is seen as the solution. The way to make it happen is through 
negotiations. 
Through all of this the preferences of the nation state and its agents remain the same. 
Arguments from other nation states will not make them change their mind. The 
institution itself cannot make the actors redefine their interests. 
 
However, identifying a policy area, participating in negotiations and enforcing an 
agreement are expensive. Moravcsik claims that international institutions can relieve 
all those obstacles. Not only can they relieve the situation, the reason why nation states 
create international institutions in the first place is to achieve policy co-ordination 
more cost efficiently. By providing rules for decision making and routines on how to 
settle disputes, international institutions is a cheaper solution than for example bilateral 
negotiations. 11 
All these factors are seen as the reason why a nation state would want policy co-
ordination. It explains the demand for the European Union. 
 
According to Moravscik, a fruitful way of analysing the EU is by way of regime12 
theory. International institutions are from this viewpoint a means of reducing 
                                                                                                                                                        
politicians seek power by constructing coalitions among those groups. At the international 
level, national governments seek to maximise their own ability to satisfy domestic pressures, 
while minimizing the adverse consequences of foreign developments.” In Putnam `s work the 
first level is to negotiate with the other actors, and the second level is to ratify the agreement 
with support from home. 
11 Moravcsik 1993:497 
12 Moravcsik refers back to Robert O. Keohane `s work about international regimes. Keohane 
uses Stephen Krasner `s definition on regimes. Krasner defines international regimes as ” sets 
of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which 
actors` expectations converge in a given area of international relations. Principles are beliefs 
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transaction costs.13 Regimes also serve as a framework in which information is 
exchanged and uncertainty is reduced. The institutional framework does not have a 
role to play. It is passive, and only makes up the environment in which efficient 
intergovernmental bargaining takes place. The structures of an institution could not 
have its own agenda and could certainly not act to serve its interests. The institutional 
structures is merely the environment that surrounds decisions to co-operate14 with 
other   states, they do not have an effect on the decisions made. Institutions promote 
international co-operation by being a forum where information is given and ideas are 
discussed; a locus for representatives of business, political parties, national 
bureaucracies, and interests groups to discuss issues of common concern and joint 
decision – making procedures. Institutions offer political and legal norms and they are 
monitoring and evaluating national compliance. 
Moravcsik claims that the EU can be viewed as a successful intergovernmental 
regime, because it provides all these things. 
Major accomplishments are reached as a result: - the efficiency of interstate bargaining 
is increased.  
-  EU institutions makes out the second level in a “two level game”. This allows 
politicians to act on the international arena with a bigger leeway than they would 
normally have. The politicians can act more freely because of backing by the EU 
institutions. Still their job is to realise national preferences, and they do so by finding 
solutions to common problems within the institutional frame.  
 
Even though Mr. Moravscik considers regime theory to be a good basis for 
understanding the European Union, he realises that the EU goes beyond what one 
normally expects from a regime. 
                                                                                                                                                        
of fact, causation, and rectitude. Norms are standards of behaviour defined in terms of rights 
and obligations. Rules are specific prescriptions or proscriptions for action. Decision-making 
procedures are prevailing practices for making and implementing collective choice”. Krasner 
1983:2  
13 Transaction costs are costs of identifying issues, negotiation bargains, codifying 
agreements, and monitoring and enforcing the agreement. Moravcsik 1993:508. 
14 Keohane argues: ” Intergovernmental co-operation takes place when the policies actually 
followed by one government are regarded by its partners as facilitating realization of their 
own objectives, as the result of a process of policy coordination. Keohane 1984:51-52- 
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He states that regime theory must be extended. He bases this assumption of EU as 
more than a regime on what he depicts as polling and delegating of sovereignty. 
Sovereignty from nation states is being pooled through qualified majority voting. 
Semi-autonomous central institutions are delegated autonomy from the nation states.   
Moravcsik explains the conditions that determines in which cases nation states will 
prefer to make their decisions unanimously or prefer an agreement that requires an 
institution that pools and delegates their sovereignty.  
He states that the nation states wants to realise their interests. They evaluate what 
solutions would work best and how much it would cost to solve their problem. They 
know that there is a whole line of political issues that needs to be fixed. They choose 
institutions with a pooling and delegating ability, if they see this as the most 
inexpensive solution.  
However certain risks are involved. They run the risk of being outvoted in policy 
issues. If they get a more efficient collective decision – making on the average, they 
are often willing to take that risk. This solution does not provide them with a 
controlled form of collective decision – making. That is why some nation state would 
prefer unanimity voting.  
 
The motive to co-operate is the potential gains. It can be hard to obtain ones goals if 
unanimity is required. Time pressure makes it harder for every actor to agree, and 
hence they resolve to pooling and delegating decision – making instead. If there have 
been several failures to reach an agreement, or decisions made earlier have not been 
implemented, the need to fix the problems fast will make the actors choose to have 
institutions that delegate and pool sovereignty. Because if status quo means that these 
problems are not fixed, and change means an increase of the chance that the problems 
would be resolved, they would chose change which means increased co-operation. 
They will choose to pool and delegate authority. On the other hand, pooling and 
delegating authority from nation states to international institutions can encourage issue 
linkages. Issue linkages can make it harder for social groups in nation states to find out 
whether they benefit or loose on an agreement. If nation states bargains under 
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unanimity it can be easier to find out which social group is loosing on such an 
agreement. 
If a social group or government have strong preferences and expect co-operation to 
increase their gains, they are probably willing to take more risks. Meaning the 
probability of a large downside loss, to a government or interest group. Governments 
are only willing to delegate and pool, when the likelihood of a political loss is low. 
That includes not delegating or pooling authority to a system that is biased to them. 
Therefore governments tend to delegate authority just enough to get their preference 
through. 
These conditions for when unanimity or pooling and delegating of authority is chosen 
is reflected in three important instances: - external representation, agenda – setting and 
enforcement.  
They need someone who can represent the EU as a whole, to third parties. 
This is a role that the Commission often holds, and authority has been delegated to 
them to enable them to perform. However, the member governments are strictly 
monitoring the Commission. It is implied by Moravcsik that the governments chose to 
delegate, but they can just as easily withdraw the autonomy. 
Supranational officials can only take independent initiatives under severe time 
pressure with a high probability of non-agreement.15  
National governments also allow the Commission to have an agenda – setting 
function. Were the nation states agree, giving the Commission the authority to set the 
agenda, will be an efficient solution. This is wise when the national governments 
agree, but it is implied that it need not be the case if preferences differ.  
The commission `s role is mainly to provide technical information and agenda control. 
The Commission is from this angle a handy tool in the hands of national governments, 
nothing more. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
15 Moravcsik 199:511 
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1.3. Neo Institutionalism. 
1.3.1. Institutional autonomy. 
 
This explanation assumes that institutions are autonomic and have internal dynamics. 
Certain structures and processes evolve historically through selective experience and 
become the basis of self – organisation.16 
The past does matter. Choices made earlier create paths that one often chose to follow 
because of the cost of defection.17 Certain experiences are made through time. One 
learns.18 Through this learning process, experience are gathered and manifested in 
procedures, routines and rules19 on how to behave in specific circumstances.20 The 
experiences are systematically and eventually organise the institution. Because of 
previous development institutions can be hard to change. It can be robust towards 
influence from outside, but it can also be hard to change within.  
The institutions are unaffected by environmental influence. They remain relatively 
stable and independent of the environment. Efforts to reorganise the institutions, does 
                                                 
16 Johan P. Olsen (1992): “Analysing Institutional Dynamics”, Staatswissenschaften und 
Staatspraxis3: 247-271  
17 Paul Pierson claims the original choices that were made by decision – makers have an 
affect on possible changes. Possible changes are estimated according to the existing rules. The 
existing rules diminish the amount of options. Defecting from what already exist has a cost. 
This is how formed decisions create paths that decision – makers’ stick to in order to keep the 
cost down. 
18 Simon Bulmer 1999:4  “Although they are still young, the institutions of the EU are not 
free of values. Embedded within them are values and norms that evolve gradually over time 
through learning-by-doing. Such institutional norms may have a significant impact on 
functions allocated to the EU are in fact operationalised. These norms and values may also be 
subject to stronger, political change”.  
19 March & Olsen 1989: 22 “ By “rules” we mean the routines, procedures, conventions, roles, 
strategies, organizational forms, and technologies around which political activity is 
constructed. We also mean the beliefs, paradigms, codes, cultures, and knowledge that 
surround, support, elaborate, and contradict those roles and routines.”  
20 Bart Kerrmans claims in “Do Institutions Make a Difference? Non – Institutionalism, Neo – 
Institutionalism, and the Logic of Common Decision – Making in the European Union.” 1996 
that: “The role of decision – makers is double. They are supposed to translate specific societal 
interests within the decision – making system on the one hand and to act according to the 
rules and norm of that system on the other hand. The last role is preserved by the system 
itself. By participating at and interacting during the decision – making, decision – makers 
increasingly internalise their role as a decision – maker” p 222.  
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not really change the institution. The norms and rules21 that are institutionalised 
through time are instilled in the institution and make the institution rigid. 
 
1.3.2. Human behaviour. 22 
 
Human action is derived from a conception of identity or role. 
Human action is not only a question of maximising ones interests. 
Ones actions23 can also be restrained by the rules of the institution. Certain perceptions 
of right and wrong are instilled in the institution. Those values define which actions 
are appropriate or not. Maximising ones interests can be appropriate to do, 24 but it can 
also keep us from maximising them.25 Not only do institutions define appropriate 
behaviour, they can also define and change ones identity. A role is given and a purpose 
of that role follows. Being in that role can influence people `s perceptions of what they 
are and develop a sense of loyalty to the institution they represent. With the role, 
certain perceptions on how to behave, follows. Certain routines exist on what to do in 
certain situations. Appropriate behaviour and Standard Operating Procedures predict 
that certain choices of behaviour and action is being pursued in a certain situation. If 
                                                 
21 March & Olsen 1989:37 Rule following do not necessarily eliminate conflict. “Different 
actors learn different rules and concepts of appropriateness as members of different national 
cultures, sub communities, professions, and formal organizations. Frequently such rules are in 
disagreement or contradict each other. Major political conflicts are focused on which set of 
rules should prevail when and where.”  
22 March & Olsen 1989:21 ”Much of the behaviour we observe in political institutions reflects 
the routine way in which people do what they are supposed to do. Simple stimuli trigger 
complex, standardized patterns of action without extensive analysis, problem solving, or use 
of discretionary power. Institutions have a repertoire of procedures, and they use rules to 
select among them. The rules may be imposed and enforced by direct coercion and political or 
organizational authority, or they may be part of a code of appropriate behaviour that is learned 
and internalised through socialization or education.”  
23 March & Olsen 1989:23 states that the terminology that explains human behaviour is one of 
duties and obligations rather than anticipatory, consequential decision-making. “ Political 
actors associate specific actions with specific situations by rules of appropriateness. What is 
appropriate for a particular person in a particular situation is defined by political and social 
institutions and transmitted through socialization. Search involves an inquiry into the 
characteristics of a particular situation, and choice involves matching a situation with 
behaviour that fits it.”  
24 Christensen & Rørvik 1999 
25 Olsen 1989. 
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perceptions of appropriate behaviour or SOPs are not followed, sanctions can be 
made.26  
The standard operating procedures are also funded and the institutions themselves 
regulate the use of resources. In this way institutions can constrain both the behaviour 
of individuals as well as governments.27      
   
1.3.3. Meaning.28 
 
Meaning29 and thereby an understanding of self and history, is constructed through 
political and social process.30 History defines who we are. Through time we make 
experiences that explain to us what things are like and how the world works.  
Going through the same experiences through time will give us a common identity. It 
will also instil in us a belief of what the common good is. It will affect how we define 
what is in our interests.31 
So defining ones interest32 can be the end result of a learning process, not necessarily 
something defined rationally in advance.33  
                                                 
26 Elias 1939 
27 Walzer 1983 
28 The world is an ambiguous place filled with uncertainty. As individuals we interpret 
situations and events and we try to find the meaning of life. We interpret situations and events 
and we come up with explanations to why and how. These explanations evolve through time 
and give us an understanding of where we come from, where we are going and who we are. 
March & Olsen 1989:42 
29 We are led to a perspective that challenges the first premise of many theories of politics, the 
premise that life is organized around choice. Rather, we might observe that life is not only, or 
primarily, choice but also interpretation. Outcomes can be less significant – both 
behaviourally and ethically – than process. The process gives meaning to life, and meaning is 
a major part of life. The reason that people involved in politics devote so much time to 
symbols, myth, and rituals is that they (appropriately) care about them. March & Olsen 
1989:51  
30 Olsen J. P (1992): ” Analysing Institutional Dynamics”, Staatswissenschafen und 
Staatspraxis 3: 247-271. 
31 March og Olsen 1989:251 
32 Clusters of beliefs and norms are formed and changed within political institutions. Values 
and preferences of political actors are not exogenous to political institutions but develop 
within those institutions. March & Olsen 1989:40 
33 Because people are trying to justify their preferences and give reasons for their preferences, 
they are open for persuasion, propaganda and other activities aimed at changing actor `s 
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To learn is to define ones interests. Learning through time gives us an idea of what we 
are and what serves us best. Institutions are created and upheld on the basis of those 
learning experiences, and we feel more at ease because institutions gives us 
anticipations about what is know and what will be.34 
Institutions do not just help us explain the present and the future, they also helps us 
figure out whether what goes on is wrong or right. 
Institutions can be a normative outline. 
 
1.3.4. History. 
 
Institutions are not disconnected from history. Institutions evolve through history. The 
historical context has an impact and it moulds the institution. Therefore institutions are 
a result of history and not just a result of environment or human design.35 Central to 
understanding an institution `s dynamics is evaluating the institution `s identity and 
history. The context of the past is just as important as the context of today. Certain 
beliefs and values are a part of that context. The values of a specific time are 
transcended into institutions. The institutions are carriers of these beliefs and values. 
Values from one time are through institutions brought to a different time, no matter 
whether the environment change or decision – makers try to reinvent the institution. 
Hence, institutions create order and continuity. 
The ideas held by an institution can sometimes bounce of new ideas. New beliefs that 
do not match with existing beliefs can be rejected. Old ways of solving problems are 
preferred over new ones. Change is therefore hard. Because the instilled values in the 
institution will set boundaries for institutional change. Boundaries will be set by 
                                                                                                                                                        
assessments and therefore their behaviour. The institutions do more than just link preferences 
and choices. The institutions play a role in defining the preferences. Kerrmans p.221 
34 Olsen 1992: “Analysing Institutional Dynamics.”, Staatswissenschaften und Staatspraxis 
3:247-271. 
35 Paul Pierson argues that institution evolve over time. This has led to unexpected outcomes 
of decisions made. The member countries preference `s can change, which mean that the 
formal structures of the institution no longer fit the countries needs. As a result gaps occur. 
Gaps are significant divergences between the institutional and policy preferences of member 
states and the actual functioning of institutions and policies. This means that the institution 
can gain autonomy, but the member states will try to regain control. 
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history, even if the environment or decision – makers want change. Change is hard and 
also costly. The money spent on realising goals based on identities and values makes it 
hard to stray away from the path that is selected previously. Starting over, choosing 
another path is expensive. It seems cost – efficient to use what is already there. This 
does not mean that institutions never change, but they do so because of a change in 
beliefs, norms and their interpretations of these norms and beliefs. As a result, change 
will be most of the time slow and incremental.36  
   
Linked to the institutional autonomy aspects, we find the contributions of Morten 
Egeberg. He emphasis the institutions` basic organisational principles, and argues that 
governance transformation can be analysed through means of organisational 
principles.37 These principles can also explain how the actors behave. Political 
processes are manifested in how institutions are organised. The organisational 
configuration is a result of the past. Even though they do not reflect the process 
perfectly, the configuration is an indicator of how power is divided between the 
institutional units.  
Once the organisational structures38 are there, obviously the policy processes do not 
stop. The policy processes still runs through those structures. That gives the structures 
the opportunity to influence the policy processes, and they do. 
The structures have an affect on the policy processes. 
                                                 
36 Bart Kerremans states: “The adaptive character of institutions makes it possible to reconcile 
continuity and change. Society changes, institutions change as well to cope with this changing 
society. What is underestimated however, is the fact that the adaptive capacity of institutions 
and rules is low.” “Neo – institutionalism assumes that adaptations to changing circumstances 
will be triggered by the institutions themselves and will be, therefore slow and incremental.” 
From the article: “Do Institutions Make a Difference? Non – Institutionalism, Neo – 
Institutionalism, and the Logic of Common Decision – Making in the European Union”p.224.  
37 Luther Gulick 1937:3 “Every large-scale or complicated enterprise requires many men to 
carry it forward. Wherever many men are thus working together the best results are secured 
when there is a division of work among these men. The theory of organization, therefore, has 
to do with the structure of co-ordination imposed upon the work – division units of an 
enterprise.” 
38 March & Olsen 1989:27 “Regardless of the way in which institutions are structured, 
attention is a scarce good in politics; and control over the allocation of attention is important 
to a political actor. By inhibiting the discovery of and entry into some potential conflicts, a 
structure of rules organized into relatively discrete responsibilities channels political energies 
into certain kinds of conflicts and away from others.” 
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This would bring us to think that the way institutions are organised has an affect on 
how it works.  
So if an institutional unit is organised according to the geographical area (place) 39 
served, this institutional unit will work differently than the unit organised according to 
function (process), purpose (sector) or clientele (matériel). 
The motivation for organizing according to geographical area is to enhance the co-
ordination and control of services given in that area. It would be easier to adapt policy 
programs to the needs of the areas served. This would also mean that differences 
between the needs of different areas would be clearly expressed at headquarters.40  
In my case geographical area would mean a nation state. 
Organizing principles that strengthened national differences would make it more 
difficult to co-ordinate policy across national boundaries. 
If an institutional unit were to be organised according to purpose, this would link 
policy issues (sectors) across territorial units.  
The accomplishment of a purpose would be paramount for the unit. The energies and 
loyalties of the personnel would be directed at doing their best to fulfil the purpose at 
hand.41  
This would imply that the organizing principles have an affect on the political process 
within the institution. The political processes are led by these organizational 
principles, as water in a channel. The organising principles lead the political processes 
in different directions towards some actors and away from others. 
In my case a geographical organization would lead the political processes towards 
national actors. Vice- versa a structure based on the organization principle of purpose 
(sector) would lead the political processes away from national actors and towards 
actors united by purpose across national boundaries. 
The organizing principles can turn the conflicts away from the national sphere to 
conflicts between institutional units and sector conflicts.  
                                                 
39 March & Olsen 1989:26 ” Many of the rules within political institutions are essentially 
devices for partitioning politics into relatively independent domains. The classical partitioning 
device is citizenship based on geography, a way of dividing a large world into a large number 
of small states.” 
40 Gulick, 1937:26-30 
41 Gulick 1937:21-23 
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Which one of these two organisational principle dominates the centre of the institution, 
tells us how integrated the system is. 
This means that if non – territorial principles of organisational specialisation have 
taken clear precedence over the territorial principle at the centre, the political system is 
highly integrated.  
This does not mean that the territorial aspect do not exist in a highly integrated system, 
they are there to a less extent than non – territorial principles. Some institutional units 
are formally “institutions of non – territorial politics” could have certain aspects that 
we would normally think of as territorial.42 
It is assumed that different organisational structures could have an affect on the 
process and the decision at the end of the process. By knowing the structure, one can 
to a certain extent predict the outcome. If one were to change the structures from 
geographical specialised organisation to a purpose-specialised organisation, one would 
expect a shift in conflict based on geography to a conflict based on policy area.43  
It is not a question of one principle and not the other. Both principles will probably be 
found within the same unit. The consequence is that the people within these structures 
perceive these competing principles. They are affected by these principles. It gives 
them ambiguous and multiple roles and identities. Their different roles and identities 
make them a part of several entities or normative settings.44  
The different roles and identities do not automatically create more conflicts.45 Crossing 
lines of conflicts can make them understand other decision – makers, because they are 
united in other issue or territorial areas. If they are, this will perhaps be an incentive to 
cooperate. Policy – coordination may be improved.46 
 
 
                                                 
42 Egeberg sees the Commission as an institutional unit that is organised on the basis of non – 
territorial principles. Still, member governments appoint the Commissioners and national 
experts are in the Commission `s committees.  
43 Egeberg 2000:4-5. 
44 March 1994:68-33 
45 March & Olsen 1989:26  “Co-ordination across boundaries is more difficult than within 
them. Different sets of rules tend to evolve independently in different domains.”  
46 Egeberg 2000:5 
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1.4. Expected findings looking through a Liberal Intergovernmental- or a Neo 
Institutional lens. 
 
So how does this apply to my case study?  
As you can see, I have chosen two theoretical categories. Each theoretical category has 
certain characteristics. They outline different explanations as to what causes change, 
what the actors are, and how they behave. They explain decisions made differently.  
Looking through each of these lenses would give me different perspectives on the 
process leading up to the Commissions resignation. 
I would make different assumptions on what I would see looking through each lens. 
Looking through a Liberal Intergovernmental lens I would assume that the actors 
involved are representing nation states or someone acting with the national interest at 
heart. 
Second I would assume that the actors are rational and that they are trying to maximise 
their interests. 
Third I would assume that once the domestic struggle is over, the national preferences 
are set and their preferences do not change. 
Fourth if sovereignty is transferred to the institution it is the result of the Member 
States choice and their motive is to increase the institution `s efficiency. 
 
Looking through a Neo Institutional lens I would assume that the actors involved 
could be the institution itself or units within the institution such as the European 
Parliament and the Commission. 
Second I would assume that the European Union or units within the institution have 
defined their own interest and that increased autonomy is part of that definition. 
Third I would assume that the actors` behaviour is influenced by their perception of 
identity and role developed through time, but also by rules and procedures. 
Fourth I would assume that the structures of the EU have an effect on the policy 
processes. If an institutional unit were to be organised according to sector, this would 
link policy issues across territorial units. Party lines could also have an effect on the 
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actors` behaviour. Both sector organisation and party lines can turn the policy 
processes away from the national sphere. 
Fifth I would assume that the EU is highly integrated were non-territorial factors such 
as sector organisation and party lines are just as important as territorial ones.  
  
1.5. Method.  
 
As the Commission resigned 15.march 1999 I thought:  
How can I explain the Commission `s resignation?  
The situation previous to the Commission `s resignation seemed so complex and 
chaotic. It was difficult to make out how this came about. 
I decided to write about the situation leading towards the resignation, hoping to be able 
to explain it.  
My aim is clear: To explain the resignation of the Commission as a result of a process 
manifested in processes 1, 2 and 3:A, Band C, by the use of Neo Institutional – and 
Liberal Intergovernmental lenses. 
Since I want to explain the resignation of the Commission, I am dealing with an 
explanatory case.47 
Still, I have made a detailed and “thick” description of the processes that had an 
important part to play in chapter 2. 
 
What then explains that this is an explanatory case? 
I had a look at a different case study by Graham Allison: “Conceptual models and the 
Cuban missile crisis” (1969). 
Allison sets forward three conceptual models. Each model explains how Soviet 
missiles were detected on Cuba and how a trade blockade against Cuba came about.  
Model 1 outline that what must be explained is an action, i.e. the realization of some 
purpose of intention. Model 1 assumes that the actor is the national government and 
                                                 
47 A case study is an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within 
its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not 
clearly evident Yin 1994:13  
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that the actions chosen is a result of a calculated response to a strategic problem.48 
Model 1 depicts action as a unitary, rational decision-making: centrally controlled, 
completely informed, and value maximising.  
Model 2 argues that a “government consists of a conglomerate of semi feudal, loosely 
allied organizations, each with a substantial life of its own”. 
Model 2 government leader do sit formally, and to some extent in fact, on top of this 
conglomerate. Governments perceive problems through organizational sensors. 
Governments define alternatives and estimate consequences as organizations process 
information.49 Model 3 describes the leaders who sit on top of organizations as players 
in their own right in a central, competitive game. The leaders bargain along 
regularized channels among players positioned hierarchically within the government.50 
“What the nation does is sometimes the result of the triumph of one group over others. 
More often, however, different groups pulling in different directions yield a resultant 
distinct from what anyone intended”.51  
Allison claims that he had a greater purpose than just explaining the case. He wanted 
to instil in us a self-conscious understanding about what observers bring to the 
analysis. What an observer perceives as important is not just about what happened. 
The “conceptual lenses” through which we see, zooms us in to what is important. 
These conceptual models have significant content of our mind.52  
It is not sufficient to describe what went on leading to a specific event to have 
explained it. It is necessary to also select which are the more important determinants of 
the matter at hand. 
If an explanation answers the question: Why did the explanadum-phenomenon occur? 
This is an explanation if I can explain that the incidence was to be expected if I 
consider the circumstances and models at hand. If I see the evidence through the lenses 
                                                 
48 Allison 1969:693 
49 Allison 1969:698 
50 Allison 1969:705 
51 Allison 1969:707 
52 Allison 1969:689-691 
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of the models and answer the question: why did this occur? Then I would have created 
an explanation.53  
Allison `s models gives us specific expectations according to which model we see 
thing through. As you can see the same thing is done in my case study. Models are 
outlined and expectations to what you will find if you see through each theoretical 
lens, is listed.  
These models are significant not only in outlining what to expect. They also narrow 
the scope of what is relevant and give important messages about what kind of data 
material is needed. By showing what data material is needed these theoretical models 
will help me link the data material to my initial questions:  
How can I explain the Commission `s resignation?  
The models therefore help me to line up my research design.54 The purpose of such a 
research design is not to end up with conclusions that does not relate to my initial 
questions.55  
The research design does not only keep me on the right track, it helps me realise my 
goal: Analytic generalisation. The theoretical level is also the level at which the 
generalisation of the case study results will occur.56  
Both Olsen `s and Egeberg `s version of Neo Institutionalism are rivals to Liberal 
Intergovernmentalism. The empirical results of the case study are compared to the 
rival theories Neo Institutionalism and Liberal Intergovernmentalism.57  
The point is to see which one of these explanations actually fit with my empirical data 
material. Which of these theoretical contributions is weakened and which is 
strengthened. Both theories cannot be strengthened because Liberal 
Intergovernmentalism and Neo Institutionalism state two different things. 
 
A traditional argument against single-case studies is that it cannot be used to 
generalise to theory. This argument is based on the wrong perception of what analytic 
                                                 
53 Allison 1969:689-691 
54 Yin 1994:19 
55 Yin 1994:20 
56 Yin 1994:30 
57 Yin 1994:31 
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generalization is. The case is not to be treated as a respondent in a survey. The goal is 
not to generalize to the universe. The point is that one single case can be used to 
determine whether theoretical propositions are met or not. If one case `s empirical data 
supports one of the theoretical propositions, this theory `s propositions are 
strengthened. By that I want to be able to generalize my case study `s findings beyond 
the immediate case study. I want to be able to show that one of the theories 
propositions is strengthened, and that the opposing theoretical propositions are 
weakened. I do believe my single-case can be used to test theory. Apart from being 
able to test theory, my single-case is able to explain something unique: the 
Commissions resignation. It is a fact that the European Union `s Commission has 
never resigned before. 
 
In this case study I will follow three processes: 1:The UCLAF process, 2: the ECHO 
process and process 3 with three links A, B and C. Central units in the processes are 
the European Parliament and the Commission. I have therefore the European Union as 
my unit of analysis, but also the UCLAF, the ECHO, the European Parliament and the 
Commission as my subunits. As a result my case study has an embedded design. The 
subunits give my research an embedded form and help me to stick to my initial 
questions. I must make sure I also take a holistic view and lift my eyes from the 
subunits to the European Union as a whole. 
I have also chosen a time interval for my case study. My timeline starts at 14. 
September 1998, and ends on 15. March 1999 when the Commission resigned.  
 
1.5.1. Validity and reliability. 
 
Lets move on to the data material gathering phase. One of the most important aspects 
of a research design is that the data material collected can actually be linked to the 
initial theoretical propositions. Therefore my theoretical propositions are guidelines for 
what material to collect. The clearer these theoretical propositions are, the easier it is 
to know what material to look for. In this phase of the research process I was 
concerned with constructing validity. Which would mean that the events I have chosen 
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to study are directly linked to the purpose of the case study. In my case this would 
mean that the ECHO-, UCLAF and third process A, B and C are directly linked to the 
Commission `s resignation.  
This would also mean that I have to choose how to measure the changes in these 
processes. How I choose to measure these changes will have to reflect the types of 
changes I have decided to explain. These measures have to be valid according to what 
events I want to explain. The measures I choose to explain the Commissions 
resignation will have to be related to the processes leading to the Commissions 
resignation. This means that since I have chosen to study why the Commission 
resigned I have to justify why I am using certain text items as sources. I have to 
explain why these texts are valid measures of what happened in the process leading to 
the Commission `s resignation. 58  
 
What can I do to strengthen my validity? 
I make sure I use different kinds of sources that are independent of another and that 
corroborate with one another. Different sources will be linked together and portray 
fact. However it is important to remember that the sources I have used were not 
intended for my use in the first place. They were written in a different context, which 
originally has nothing to do with my research. Originally these documents, bulletins, 
press releases and Official Documents were written for different readers than myself. 
Each of these sources serves a different purpose than to function as my data material. 
The writer or writers had different intentions with their written work. I will use this 
material and as I do so, I take these texts out of their context. I puzzle different bits 
together and I check whether their stories match. I therefore construct what I believe is 
the facts from these text items.  
For example I have used the Committee of Independent Experts` Rapport. It is a result 
of 6 weeks work and perhaps a bit hasty. Therefore I decided to use it to track down 
the original sources in the report, mainly Herbert Bösch `s report, and the Independent 
Experts report also brought the Court of Auditor report `s to my attention. Obviously 
the original sources that the Committee of experts have used are to be preferred.   
                                                 
58 Yin 1994:34 
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 European Parliament members have been active writing reports. It is important to be 
aware of the fact that they are members of an institutional unit and obviously they 
would perceive the role of the European parliament as positive. On the other hand I 
have used the Commission `s official press releases. They portray a situation from the 
Commission `s perspective, that is a situation handled in an orderly manner.  
I have compared both the reports from parliament members, the Commission `s press 
releases and the report of the Committee of Independent Experts with one another and 
the version of Official Journal. I have also used a bulletin called “Bulletin Quotidien 
Europe” which is produced in Brussels by Europe S.A.  Europe S.A. is a private 
international press agency. It was founded in 1952 in Luxembourg and later 
established themselves in Brussels. They insist on being a multinational team of 
journalists who deal with information independently of countries and institutions.59 
However I have checked the information in “Bulletin Quotidien Europe” with articles 
in “European-Voice” a newspaper that is part of the Economist Group. 
By conducting an inquiry where the multiple sources of evidence converge is the best 
way of improving my validity.  
However this has not been easy. A lot of my data material is a result of extensive 
search on the Internet. I have often used the European Unions own home page 
www.europe.eu.int. It is important to stress that each institutional unit has their own 
page and the facts gathered comes from these pages. That is not the same as being 
neutral. The texts that I have used are obviously a result of that particular unit `s views 
on the matter at hand.60  
 
Reliability is about documenting the procedures followed in the case study. The point 
is to minimize the errors and biases in this study.61 
How do I go about documenting the procedures I have followed?  
I can identify the necessary steps to be taken and describe these steps as closely as I 
can. This will make it easier to repeat the procedures I have followed and conclude 
with the same results as I. 62  
                                                 
59 http://www.agence-europe.com 
60 Dahl 1967:31-48 
61 Yin 1994:36 
 26
I can enhance the reliability further by using a Case Study Protocol. 
The Case Study Protocol contains an overview of the Case Study Project, Case study 
Questions and a Guide of what you will find in the Case Study Report.63 I believe this 
is discussed all throughout section “Method” in this chapter. 
 
The reliability can also be improved by creating a Case Study Database. 
The Case Study Database contains information about how the Data Material is 
documented and organised. It is important to understand that the Case Study Database 
is not identical with a Case Study Report. The Case Study Report is the result of the 
data material gathered. It is therefore important to go back to the original data material 
used, to understand The Case Study Report `s conclusions. A Case Study Database 
could consist of several elements. In my data material collecting-phase I have created 
journals were I have pinpointed empirical events on a timeline. However, all of my 
data material is not lined up in these journals, simply because there was not room for 
everything. Still, it made it easier to organise my data material in time, and the other 
sources were plotted in on the time line as I started writing Chapter 2.  
Second, all the documents, reports press releases and Bulletins are available for others 
to check. The journals that specify the timeline the empirical events are on and the 
retrievable documents make it possible to establish a Chain of Evidence. Which means 
that my initial questions are linked with my conclusions through the processes I have 
followed and described.  
Let me guide you through what you will find in this Case Study Report: 
In chapter 1 I have stated my aim for this case study. I have listed which theoretical 
propositions I have used to explain this case.  
I have also discussed method issues that were relevant for the situation at hand. 
In chapter 2 I will give a thorough empirical description. 
In chapter 3 I will place the empirical data within the theoretical framework. Thus the 
Commissions resignation is explained within a theoretical framework. My aim is to 
                                                                                                                                                        
62 Yin 1994:37 
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strengthen some theoretical propositions and thereby weaken the opposing theoretical 
propositions. 
Chapter 4 contains my concluding arguments. 
 
 
Chapter 2. 
 
2.1. Process number 1: UCLAF. 
2.1.1. The history of UCLAF. 
 
In the beginning, several DG `s (mainly 6, 20 and 21) handled the work against fraud. 
In 1987 the Commission decided a central co-ordination unit was needed.64 As a result 
UCLAF – Unité de Coordination de la Lutte Antifrude was constituted in 1988.65  
This was an administrative unit under the General Secretariat, with teams in different 
directorates-generals (DG). The unit was to co-ordinate the activities of these teams; 
and at that stage UCLAF had only 10 officials. 
A Director led the officials, and it was foreseen that more staff would be granted.66  
They did get more staff. The European Parliament entered 50 new posts for 
investigative staff in 1994. The posts were filled the following year. 67 
 
With this staff a new process began – the process of centralisation.  
The Commission decided to transfer the responsibilities of the different DGs in the 
fight against fraud to UCLAF, under the authority of a separate “ anti – fraud 
commissioner.”68 
 
Parallel with the centralisation process, UCLAF `s mandate was formed. 
By 1995 certain UCLAF activities were considered important, including: 
                                                 
64 Court of Auditor `s Special Report 8/1998. 
65 The European-Fraud Prevention Office http://europa.eu.int/dgs/anti_fraud/mission-en.htm. 
66 Court of Autitor `s Special Report 8 /1998. 
67 Herbert Bösch `s Report 22.09.98 A4-0297/98. 
68 Court of Auditor `s Special Report 8/1998 p.3. 
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- The protection of the financial interests of the community. 
- The concept of the fight against fraud in all areas. 
- The development of the necessary infrastructure for the fight against fraud        
(databases etc.) 
- The collection of information concerning fraud cases and the treatment of this 
information. 
- The operational measures (enquiries etc).69 
By 1997 UCLAF was assisting Member State prosecutors with cross – boarder 
prosecutions. This was a task that became more and more important as the years 
went by. It triggered the debate of what UCLAF `s role should be, and how UCLAF 
should be organised.  
 The debate concerning UCLAF `s independence started and the debate escalated 
with a growing workload and more staff.70  
 
What was the situation like when I start my time interval September 14 1998? 
 
UCLAF was at the time led by a Director managing two horizontal units, supporting 
four different operational units. Each of the four units was organised according to 
separate tasks. 
F1 war responsible for general policy matters, judicial questions and co-ordination, F2 
for intelligence, information and evaluation of the legislation, F3 for the structural 
funds and other domains, F4 for import / export of agricultural products, F5 for the 
Common Market Organisations in Agriculture and F6 was responsible for Own 
Resources. 
All in all UCLAF was dealing with at least 2000 cases, costing at least 3000 Mio ECU 
a year. The Commission spent 11,1 Mio ECU in 1997.71 
 
 
 
                                                 
69 Court of Auditor `s Special Report 8 /1998. 
70 Herbert Bösch Report 22.09.98.p.10 
71 Court of Auditor `s Special Report 8 /1998 p.11, 41-43. 
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2.1.2. Mr. Santer `s October speech.    
 
Several reports had been written about UCLAF `s role, but it was one in particular that 
flared the debate. Herbert Bösch `s report contained information on UCLAF `s alleged 
lack of performance. He portrayed an institution that lacked the ability to perform in 
several cases. He questioned whether the institution was capable of investigating the 
Commission itself. President of the European Commission Mr. Santer did not approve 
of all the statements in the report. 
He took the opportunity to express his view on 7 October 1998 during the plenary 
session:  
When UCLAF was first created, direct inquiries were not on top of the agenda, Santer 
claimed. Now 950 cases are under investigation through UCLAF `s own means.72 He 
stressed that protection of EU citizens financial interest should get everyone 
involved.73 Inaccuracies about UCLAF `s role had caused confusion, but Mr. Santer 
tried to explain. 
He pointed out that UCLAF was administratively subject to the authority of the 
Secretariat – General. Its role was to co-ordinate the fight against fraud with the 
Member States. It should also set forward legislative proposals. 
Mr. Santer said: “ I do not accept the unwarranted link made in the Bösch report 
between UCLAF `s alleged lack of independence and the fact that it is administratively 
subject to the authority of the Secretariat – General of the commission (… ) I am not 
aware of any case in which senior management ever prevented UCLAF from carrying 
out investigations”.74   
 
Still, Mr. Santer proposed the creation of a new investigation office against external 
and internal fraud. “ If it is the case that because UCLAF is located within our 
structure it has the effect that the Commission `s fight against fraud is questioned, even 
denigrated, then I would prefer to move UCLAF `s investigative function outside. I am 
therefore proposing that we think along the lines of a Fraud Investigation 
                                                 
72 Bulletin Quotidien Europe No 7316 Wednesday 7 October 1998 p.11 
73 Bulletin Quotidien Europe No 7342 Saturday 14 November 1998. 
74 Bulletin Quotidien Europe No 7316 Wednesday 7 October 1998. 
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Office, working both externally and internally but in total independence from the 
Commission and with no hierarchical relationship with it.” 
Mr. Santer made it clear that he was ready to designate a senior Commission official 
quickly. If the other institutions wanted to prepare a proposal for a joint decision, Mr. 
Santer would be of service. 
Mr. Santer pointed out that this new institution OLAF would require a control device. 
This control device would have to be based on “mutual trust between the institutions”. 
These institutions (the Parliament and the Commission) should have “the same rights 
and duties as regards participation in a supervisory body, in proposals for 
appointments and relations with the Office.”75 
 
2.1.3. Parliament responds. 
 
The European parliament responded right away after Mr. Santer ´s speech. 
Mr. Bösch opened the debate by stressing how important it was for UCLAF to be 
independent. Separating the new OLAF completely from the Commission would 
however be a mistake. UCLAF would then become a satellite abandoned in space. He 
stated that it was not a question of “tabula rasa” and beginning from zero. The point 
was not to create a new institution, but to transform the existing UCLAF. This 
basically meant providing UCLAF with the necessary staff and resources, but also 
help build up databases that could be used as a tool of investigation. 
Mr. Elles ( British Conservative ) supported Mr. Bösch `s report. Mr.Elles found it “ a 
little strange” that Mr. Santer should say individual sanctions could not be imposed on 
officials who have committed irregularities for the sole purpose of enabling their 
departments to function. He stated that a witch – hunt would not be constructive. Still, 
one had to wonder where responsibility begin and end. Officials had to be accountable.  
Mrs. Moreau (Communist, France) argued for UCLAF to have more independence. 
She stated it was not possible to be both judge and judged. Since the Commission was 
“demanding with Member States, it is only fair to be demanding of it”. From her point 
                                                 
75 Bulletin Quotidien Europe No 7316 Wednesday 7 October 1998 p.11 
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of view the problem of large – scale fraud would escalate because of “ the total 
liberalisation of the movements of goods and capital”.76   
 
Both Mrs. Theato (Christian Democrat ) and Mrs. D`Ancona ( Socialist ) disagreed 
that a new unit should be formed. They wanted co-operation in this field between  
Euro – MPs and national MPs to become stronger, but a completely new institution 
was not the way to go. They realised that a broader co-operation between national MPs 
and Euro- MPs would not receive satisfactory support at that stage. 
Therefor they argued that a replacement of UCLAF was not needed. They wanted 
UCLAF ´s powers to be extended.77  
Mrs. Theato was greatly concerned about what she saw as lack of information. She 
expected the Commission to react more swiftly, and provide the EP with the necessary 
information. She said that the proposal for the creation of OLAF was lacking a legal 
basis in good and due form, but that the Parliament could not prompt the Commission 
to act. The need for a solid legal basis was also stressed by Mr. Holm (Greens, 
Sweden). He also criticised President Santer for trying, in his speech, to “ invoke the 
rights of officials”.  
Commissioner Anita Gradin reassured the Members of Parliament that the 
Commission took the criticism seriously. She stressed the fact that UCLAF was only 
ten years old. The problems UCLAF had were because of its youth, but it was 
gradually turning in to something good.78      
 
 The European Parliament voted over establishing a body that was more independent 
than UCLAF. 458 to 36 (11 not voting) voted for the creation of OLAF   (Anti-Fraud 
Office).79 The Parliament gave the Commission a final deadline. By December 1 the 
Commission should put present a proposition before the Council, Court of Justice and 
Court of Auditors.  
 
                                                 
76 Bulletin Quotidien Europe No 7318 9 October 1998 p.15. 
77 Bulletin Quotidien Europe No 7342 Saturday 14 November 1998 p.13.  
78 Bulletin Quotidien Europ No 7318 Friday 9 October 1998. 
79 Bulletin Quotidien Europ No 7317 Thursday 8 October 1998 p.14. 
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2.1.4. How should OLAF be organised? 
 
The Parliament had decided that the Commission `s proposal on the organisation of 
OLAF should contain certain aspects: 
OLAF ought to have 300 employees altogether.  
The first choice was to be “ experienced inspectors, investigators and prosecuting 
officers from the relevant departments in the member states.” 
OLAF should have a supervisory body of five people. These should be appointed by 
the Parliament with the assent of the other institutions. The people in the supervisory 
body had to have certain qualities. They had to be independent and “posses the 
qualifications required for appointment to high judicial office”, or be “jurisconsults of 
recognised competence.” 
The Commission should appoint the Director of OLAF, but after the EP `s approval. 
The other institutions could also make suggestions on candidates.   
The guiding principle should be the principle of decentralisation. OLAF should have 
departments in Brüssel and Luxembourg, with branch offices in Member States or 
third countries were necessary.80  
 
2.1.5. The Commission `s proposal in December 1998. 
 
The proposal on the creation of a “European Anti – Fraud Investigation Office” 
OLAF was presented 2 December 1998 by President Santer during the Parliament 
plenary session.81  
President Santer expressed concern about the relationship between the Commission 
and the European Parliament. He launched an appeal to “safeguard the climate of 
confidence between the Institutions and to manage our respective relations in a 
responsible manner.” 
He said that: “I find the climate in which certain debates are unfolding worrying” and 
he hoped for a “serene and responsible atmosphere.” 
                                                 
80 Bulletin Quotidien Europe No 7318 Friday 9 October 1998 p.14 
81 Bulletin Quotidien Europe No 7326 Wednesday 21 October 1998. 
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He then presided to talk about the proposal to create an independent office for anti-
fraud enquiries. Mr. Santer stressed that he thought UCLAF had always worked in full 
freedom. If one wanted to make a distinction between “ inspectors and inspected “ the 
logical step was to create a totally independent office, without links with the 
Commission or with other institutions. Awaiting the European Parliaments and the 
Councils decision on OLAF, UCLAF `s work would go on as usual.82  
     
According to the proposal, OLAF would only be responsible for one thing: 
- Investigations of suspected fraud or corruption. The Office should be responsible for 
carrying out enquiries both externally, in the Member States and internally, inside all 
institutions of the European Union.83 
Internal inquiries were to be initiated by the Commission or other European bodies 
concerned.84 The result of the investigation was to be handled by the institution in 
question.85 External inquiries should be initiated by the Commission, at the request of 
Member States, or on its own initiative.86  
The commission should have no influence over the investigation as it proceeds. After 
the investigation has taken place, the Commission should follow up OLAF `s final 
report. That could mean referral to justice or administrative steps.87  
   
According to the Commission `s proposal, an administration board with nine 
members should appoint the director of OLAF.88 Six of the members of the board 
should be independent experts of which three are designated by the European 
Parliament and three by the Council.89  
Two should be representatives from the Commission, and the last one should be a 
member of the Court of Auditors.90  
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Mr. Santer concluded on this point “ that each and everyone at present assumes their 
responsibilities. I have assumed mine. It is up to the Parliament and the Council to 
assume theirs. If there is the political will, then the decision may come about within 
six months”.91  
  
With this proposal the Commission was convinced that a good basis for discussion 
had been established. This proposal was from the Commissions point of view a 
platform to strengthen the protection of European taxpayer `s money. 
The following debate revealed that several members of the EP were not satisfied with 
this proposal. Mrs. Morgan ( British Labour MEP ) requested a list of all the 
investigations on alleged fraud. Mr. Santer replied that in principle “ there was nothing 
to oppose this “, but that such information cannot be “ divulged inconsiderately”. An 
inquiry in itself does not mean there is fraud. 
Mr. Bösch (Austrian Social Democrat) had asked for a strengthening of UCLAF `s 
independence. He did not want the creation of a separate body. He claimed: “your 
proposal has nothing to with my report”.       
 Mr. Santer replied  “we have exceeded your proposal”. 
There was a general dissatisfaction among the Parliament members with the proposal.  
Mr. Tillich ( German Christian Democrat ) expressed the general dissatisfaction when 
he said “ you are simply taking us for fools,” referring to Mr. Santer `s statements. 
 
The Commission `s proposal was received coolly at the Parliament `s Committee on 
Budgetary Control (CoCobu) as well. 
Mr. Bösch thought that the proposal was a step backwards, while the Parliament 
would like a more transparent, rapid and effective mechanism. The proposal was too 
complex and not very realistic. The Members of Parliament was concerned about what 
the institution `s relationship towards the Parliament would be. They were concerned 
about its future relationship with the Court of Auditors. 
Questions were also asked about how the new institution would perform their internal 
inquiries, and how they would get the necessary staff. Mr. Timmermans (Chairman of 
                                                 
91 Bulletin Quotidien Europe No 7355 Thursday 3 December 1998 p.14 
 35
UCLAF) stressed that the most important factor was the new institution `s 
independence.92  
 
The Commission `s first draft on how one should organise the fight against fraud was 
not agreed on. The Commission, the Council and the European Parliament consulted 
and agreed of the creation of a High – Level Group, consisting of Members from the 
Commission, the Council and the European Parliament.93 The Commission sent three 
representatives, Commissioners Anita Gradin, Mario Monti and Karel Van Miert. 
This inter – institutional High – Level Group was to examine the Commission `s 
proposal and to reach a consensus on a set of recommendations for the structure of 
OLAF.94 
On the Conference of Presidents at the end of January 1999, Mr. Santer said that it was 
“urgent” that the new Committee “created under the auspices of the Parliament and the 
Commission” began its work. It was important for the Committee to be seen to have 
the full approval and co-operation of our two institutions.” He confirmed that “ at 
political level, Vice – President Brittan and I will be at the at the Committee `s 
disposal as “ interlocutors.”95  
 
2.1.6. The results of the High – Level group `s work. 
 
The inter – institutional agreement was reached on Sunday evening 14 march 
1999.This proposal was the result of discussions between Parliament, the Council and 
the Commission. The executive branch, represented by Commissioners Gradin, Van 
Miert and Monti, led the discussion. This agreement stated that the new Office would 
remain within the Commission.  
Commissioner Karel Van Miert recalled that the Commission initially wanted to 
create a body legally independent of the Commission, but that both Parliament and the 
Member States (“except for the Netherlands”) had been against this. He said that:        
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“The Fraud prevention Office or Agency will remain within the Commission as 
Parliament and the Council requests this.” 
Even though the new institution OLAF would still be within the Commission, the 
Director would still make important decisions on his or her own. The Director can 
initiate an investigation in all Community institutions or bodies, and decide whether 
cases should be sent to legal authorities.       
The Director will be appointed for a five – year period. The Director `s time in 
office can be renewed one time. It is the Commission in agreement with the Parliament 
and the Council, which appoints him or her. 
 
The Director `s independence was manifested in the Commission communication 
accompanying the draft regulation: 
The Director “ may neither seek nor take instructions “concerning investigations. 
Apart from internal investigations the Office will also be responsible for external 
investigations in Member States and third countries for cases of fraud to the  
Community budget. External investigations cannot however excel the Commission `s 
powers in this matter. 
OLAF should also according to the inter-institutional agreement develop the legal 
framework of the fight against fraud. 
A surveillance committee made up of five or six experts in fraud – prevention will 
control the Office. These experts will be independent and appointed by the 
Commission, the Council and the Parliament.96  
In a press conference on 16 March 1999, Mrs. Dietmut Theato welcomed the 
proposal for setting up an independent anti – fraud Office (OLAF). She saw this as 
moving in the right direction. She expressed that she hoped the European Commission 
`s proposal would be approved along the lines of the inter-institutional agreement.97 
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2.2. Process number 2: ECHO 
2.2.1. The history of ECHO. 
 
The European Union is an important contributor to under developed countries: A large 
proportion of this help is humanitarian aid. The humanitarian aid is needed for 
different reasons, but basically because of natural catastrophes or armed conflicts. In 
the early 1990s two conflicts, the wars in the former Yugoslavia and the conflicts in 
Rwanda had one thing in common. There was a conflict of interest between different 
ethnic groups. These conflicts led to acts of violence. The violent acts led to massive 
migration. The refugees were forced to flee to areas witch had very limited resources.98  
The Commission wanted at that time to improve its co-ordination of humanitarian aid 
projects. They specifically wanted to improve the projects effectiveness and they also 
wanted their aid to be more noticeable. 
The Commission decided to found the European Union Humanitarian Office (ECHO) 
on 6 November 1991. ECHO was to be of service when a rapid response was needed, 
either as a result of human conflicts or natural disasters. 
ECHO was, according to the Commission `s plan, to be evaluated after seven years. 
After a thorough evaluation, they would know if they should continue or dissolve the 
institution.99 
 
Certain goals were set for ECHO. 
The necessary expertise was to be gathered in one administrative unit. ECHO was to 
be used by the European union as a tool. ECHO would enable the European Union to 
intervene more directly were the crisis occurred. ECHO would be able to relive the 
situation in each of the crisis phases. They would be present in the field assessing the 
needs. They would mobilise people, food and equipment needed. They would control 
the aid and evaluate the situation afterwards. ECHO would also co-ordinate the efforts 
made by Member States, Non-governmental organisations and International 
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organisations. The co-operation would be manifested in the use of frame contracts.100 
101 
ECHO `s mandate was expanded from the beginning of 1993 and they were at this 
time responsible for food supplies. Traditionally DG 8/5 and DG 8/B1 had taken care 
of several tings, food supplies included. As these assignments were transferred to 
ECHO, a substantial number of staff former hired by DG 8 started working for ECHO. 
This meant that ECHO was ready to take on its responsibility swiftly. Unfortunately 
they did not stay on. A large proportion of the original staff left ECHO between 1993 
and 1995. New people were hired, but did not have the same experience as those who 
left. 
Still, ECHO `s responsibilities grew. Those who did get hired were not nearly enough. 
Some vacancies were filled, but not enough. This meant that temporarily employed 
staff was used extensively (44 were temporarily employed in 1994 and 36 in 1995). 
By the end of 1995, 43 % of the staff was on temporarily contracts, which lasted for 3 
years at the most. Some were hired for a year, and some for only a few months.102 
 
As a result of UCLAF `s investigations a former Head of a financial unit was 
suspended in July 1998. But the administrative inquiry concerning the other people 
dealt with in UCLAF `s investigation, did not begin until 14 September 1998. The file 
on this issue was forwarded to the Luxembourg authorities.103 
 An administrative inquiry was opened and the pressure against the responsible 
Commissioner started to rise. 
 The European Commission spokesman responded to the rising pressure and 
confirmed that the Commissioners responsible for ECHO and the fight against fraud 
were prepared to appear “ as soon as possible ” before the European Parliament 
Committee on Budgetary Control. The Commissioners responsible for ECHO in 1995, 
Manuel Marin, and at present, Emma Bonino, Erkki Liikanen ( the Commissioner in 
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charge of internal sanctions at the Commission) Anita Gradin and (the effort to control 
fraud) would present a “ non - deformed version “ of the inquiry under way on fraud in 
the Community Humanitarian Office ECHO. They would do so on Committee of 
Budgetary Control `s meeting led by Mrs. Theato.104 
 
 
The pressure against the Commission took a turn for the worse at a press conference 
led by Edith Müller (Member of the European Parliament for the German Green). The 
topic was a Special Report by the Court of Auditors about ECHO from 1992 to 1995. 
Mrs. Müller found it particularly interesting that the Commission made certain facts 
clear in its response to this report. According to Mrs. Müller the Commission admitted 
that Manuel Marin (Commissioner with responsibility for ECHO at the time) knew in 
February 1994 that some staff at the Humanitarian Office were being paid out of 
operating credits (“mini-budgets”). Mrs. Müller further stated that the Commission had 
admitted that there had been an exchange of letters between Mr. Marin and Karel Van 
Miert (responsible at the time for personnel and administration). In these letters, Karel 
Van Miert had expressed concern about the practice of using mini-budgets as early as 
February 1994. The fact that the Commission had admitted this was positive. Mrs. 
Müller saw the Commission `s openness on this issue as progress.105     
 
All four of the Commissioners held a press conference on 17 September 1998 to 
explain the situation after meeting with the European Parliament Budget Control 
Committee (CoCobu). 
According to Emma Bonino certain administrative malfunctions were inadmissible. 
ECHO had in the past paid external staff members (27officials) out of its operating 
budget, instead of its administrative budget. 
“These were technical assistance contracts, some of which were used to run ECHO. 
The Commission used funds in an irregular manner to keep the system operating”, 
Mrs. Bonino admitted.  
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Emma Bonino was concerned about how the situation was portrayed by the press. She 
disapproved of the “ frankly intolerable “ level of “ ill – will and deceit” involved in 
some of the press` publications. From Mrs. Bonino `s point of view “ the Commission 
has shown that it is capable of auditing itself. It was neither the Parliament, nor Edith 
Müller, nor the Court of Auditors that discovered that something was wrong at the 
Commission. It was the Commission `s Anti – Fraud Unit itself.” 
She also commented on the suspension of one ECHO official, and expressed bitter 
regret that other officials who did their work correctly had been personally cited in the 
press.   
 
When irregularities occurred, Manuel Marin was the Commissioner responsible for 
ECHO. He stressed that EU basically dealt with crises in Yugoslavia and Rwanda 
through humanitarian aid. The fact that the EU considered humanitarian aid as the tool 
to relive the situation, caused a sharp increase in ECHO `s funding. However, the 
increase in the number of staff did not increase accordingly. Too few people were 
hired to administer the aid. In 1992, 43 people managed 368 million ECUs; by 1993, 
this sum had doubled and 51 people were in charge of 605 million ECUs. By 1994, 63 
officials were responsible for 764 Million ECUs, Marin explained. 
In 1994 the director of ECHO together with the administrative services made a plan. 
This was a plan on how to handle the situation with 27 external staff members, all with 
salaries from ECHO operating funds. Marin said he had corresponded with Karel Van 
Miert on how new rules could be applied.106 
 
 
Erkki Liikanen, the Commissioner in charge of administration in my time interval, 
claimed that the Commission had worked to abolish the system of “ Mini – budgets107 
“since the early 1990s. He said that the only operational research funds and structural 
funds, along with the Tacis, Phare and Meda funds could now be used to cover 
administrative costs. If there still were credits used for administration, this could be 
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revealed in an investigation by the Commission. The Commission would know the 
results shortly and would forward the information to the European Parliament during 
the fall, Liikanen indicated.108 
 
By the end of September the relationship between the Commission and the European 
Parliament was strained. Jose Maria Gil Robles and Jaques Santer had a meeting to 
address various issues concerning co-operation between the two institutions. The 
discussion included among other things the ECHO programme. 
 
A press release states:109 “The two Presidents consider it vital for the Commission to 
provide Parliament with all necessary information “ and Parliament will adopt the “ 
measures required for this information to be dealt with while observing the strictest 
respect for individual rights, using the possibilities offered by the European Parliament 
`s Rules of Procedure.”110 
 
2 October 1998 the Commission spokesman confirmed that the Commission decided 
to suspend an official. This official allegedly awarded a contract to his wife. The 
contract given was connected to ECHO projects. Parallel with this suspension, the 
matter was forwarded to the Courts in Luxembourg. The Courts in Luxembourg were 
to evaluate the possible penal implications.111 
 
 
The very same day the Commission approved a package of 942,000 ECU. The 
Democratic Republic of Congo was undergoing a crisis. 
There was a serious conflict within the country. The money was needed to support 
hospitals all over the country, but also to re- activate food programmes.112 The aid was 
to be governed by ECHO in co-operation with non-governmental organisations.113  
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Allegations were made in the press that the funding of ECHO was a waist of money. 
The European Commission spokesman strongly refuted these allegations. He said that 
some newspapers took note of the fact that the financing of humanitarian aid was 
granted without prior control. From that they derived to the conclusion that all the 
money granted was subjected to fraud. 
This conclusion was wrong, stated the spokesman. The humanitarian aid was managed 
according to ad hoc procedures. This was because of the nature of humanitarian aid. 
Humanitarian aid is needed fast. A rapid response is very important. If one were to ask 
for all the documents justifying the aid in advance, there would simply be no more 
humanitarian aid.  
Hence, funding was based on trust between ECHO and its partners: United Nations, 
Member States agencies, NGOs.   
Controls were carried out first of all a priori (at the time when partners were chosen) 
and then a posteriori on the implementation of actions financed. From the 
spokesperson `s point of view, the control system was perfect with the collaboration of 
the Court of Auditors and the Member States.114  
 
2.2.2. Mr. Santer `s October speech. 
 
Mr. Santer took the opportunity to discuss ECHO `s situation as well in his speech on 
7 October 1998. He addressed the situation generally and said: “I can agree to a more 
extensive and comprehensive disclosure to enable Parliament to fully carry out its role 
as budget watchdog. However, greater disclosure of information must be done within 
the law, taking account of the presumption of innocence and the confidentiality of 
legal investigations”.115 
 
Mr. Santer expressed that there was an “intolerable insinuation” in the Bösch report. 
The Bösch report insinuated that the European Union “has a tendency to cover up 
cases of corruption in its own ranks”, Santer said. “I take it as a personal attack         
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which I absolutely refute and which is not borne out by the facts”. 
He recalled that it was the same Commission who thanks to the work of UCLAF, 
revealed the case of fraud concerning ECHO. It was also the same Commission who 
transmitted the dossier on ECHO to the judicial authorities.  
Mr. Santer continued with a list of what the Commission had done to improve the 
situation. They had among other tings approved new guidelines on tougher action 
against professional misconduct, financial irregularities, fraud and corruption. The 
Commission had given the UCLAF inspectors new guidelines on how to go about in 
investigations. Since 1995 the Commission had dealt with 49 disciplinary cases related 
to cases of fraud or “ reprehensible behaviour”. As a result 8 officials were removed, 2 
officials were downgraded, 4 officials were relegated to a lower step. Reprimands 
were given to 11 officials and 4 officials had received written warnings. 
Hence, one cannot say that the Commission “ ever tolerated or tried to cover up any 
form of corruption” Santer said. 
However, all institutions needed to “ get to grips with the “ grey area “ of favouritism 
and conflicting interests. “ He continued: “ Let us pledge ourselves to work together to 
instil a sense of morality at all levels in the institutions.” 
Still, Mr. Santer made it crystal clear that he was not willing to conduct a “ blind 
unsubstantiated witch – hunt “ or “ sit back and see the tarnishing of the excellent 
image that the Union `s humanitarian aid has acquired throughout the whole world.”  
 
As Mr. Santer saw things, fraud and administrative irregularities were not the same 
things. 
 Fraud and administrative irregularities should not be placed on an equal footing. 
Obviously he did not support administrative irregularities. His point was that there 
were “ reasons why some departments were forced into looking for ways of 
administering their funds flexibly, not to say acrobatically in some cases.” 
As he remembered things, the Council gave new and heavy responsibilities to the 
Commission at the beginning of the nineties. These new responsibilities were often 
outside the Union, they urgently needed attention, and the resources immediately 
available meagre.  
 44
This explained these administrative acrobatics, which needed to be stopped. The 
correct response was according to Mr. Santer, not to “ impose individual sanctions on 
officials who commit these irregularities for the sole purpose of keeping departments 
running.” In 1992 the Commission had decided to put an end to administrative 
irregularities by ending the use of mini – budgets. “ The practice of using mini – 
budgets stopped in June 1995,” Santer reassured the Parliament members. 
He had also “asked every Director General for a check to be made under their own 
responsibility.” The results of these checks would be handed over to the Parliament. If 
there still were problems, the Commission would find solutions, Mr. Santer claimed.116  
 
2.2.3. A Press Conference by the Parliament.  
 
The day after Mr. Santer `s speech, Members of Parliament held a press conference in 
which Magda Aelvoet (Chairperson of the Green Group) stated her views. 
She stressed the fact that the Parliament `s role was to control the Commission. This 
required that the Parliament were fully informed. The Parliament should demand to 
see the documents the “Commission is hiding.” 
Only then would the Parliament do as the voters expected. If the Commission were 
unwilling to give them the information, the Parliament would have to “get the knives 
out.”117  
 
Edith Müller ( German Green ) approached the matter differently. She argued that it 
was not just the ECHO affair. The scandal of the EU humanitarian office was              
“exemplary”, but the problem was a general one and could be related to a number of 
cases. Mrs. Müller claimed that the Members of Parliament knew about false contracts 
and fictitious reports that were kept from them. The Commission `s lack of trust 
towards the Parliament caused a “ culture of mistrust.” The result was an “ institutional 
crisis.” Mrs. Müller assured that the Parliament did not want to discredit humanitarian 
aid. The Parliament wanted to do the opposite. They wanted to found the EU 
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humanitarian aid on a solid platform. She asked the Commission to make the UCLAF 
report available to the Parliament. A copy should be made to the EP Committee on 
Budgetary Control. If they did not do so, the Parliament would have to evaluate its 
options. One option was to refuse discharge of the 1996 budget. 
Mrs. Müller thought it was too early to speak of the possibility of censure. 
According to Mrs. Müller, assuming one `s responsibility should mean drawing the 
personal consequences. She noticed that Commissioners were unwilling to do so. 
Then President Santer must ask those responsible for the ECHO case to account for it. 
Edith Müller added: “ If Mrs. Bonino thinks that, with the simple phrase “ of course 
the Commission takes on its responsibilities “ that she can camly go on to something 
else, she has apparently not understood what political responsibility really means.”118  
 
By mid October the Commission made new concessions in the ECHO case. The 
Commission confirmed that there had been internal controls within the European 
Community Humanitarian Office. These controls revealed suspected cases of fraud or 
at least of misappropriations. A spokesman stated that as a result of regular internal 
audit, 5 contracts were seen as problematic. These contracts dated back to 1992 – 
1995. The Commission `s anti fraud fighting unit, UCLAF, had been notified.119 
 
This increased some MEP `s reluctance to release ECHO credits. Stanislav Tillich and 
Juan Manuel Fabra Valles thought it was necessary that certain conditions were met, 
before the credits were released. The most important condition was that President 
Santer kept his promises from his speech on 7 October 1998. The Commission should 
make sure that all the information that UCLAF had was placed at the disposal of the 
competent courts. Both Mr. Tillich and Mr. Fabra Valles defended themselves against 
accusations from members of the Socialist Group. It was “indecent” that they accused 
EPP of jeopardising ECHO action. When clearly they wanted ECHO to perform with 
the utmost effectiveness and transparency. 
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The Committee on Budgets were also unhappy about how the Commission had 
handled the investigations into cases of suspected fraud. They were particular unhappy 
with what they regarded as inadequate transparency. The lack of information made the 
members of the Committee on Budgets unwilling to refrain from blocking the 1999 
credits for ECHO humanitarian assistance. 
President Santer argued in a letter to Parliament President Gil-Robles against the block 
of funds. Mr. Santer stated that Article 206 of the EC Treaty instructs the Commission 
to submit to the European Parliament all the information necessary. Article 206 also 
states the need to respect the right to protection of privacy, presumption of innocence 
and the secrecy of legal proceedings in Member States. But Mr. Santer would be sure 
to give Article 206 “its full effect” in the fight against fraud. Mr. Santer made specific 
suggestions on how the Committee on Budget Control should be informed. If there 
were presumptions of fraud after an investigation, the final report would be made by 
the Director of UCLAF. The report would be given to the Committee on Budgetary 
Control, before being referred to the legal authorities. 
 
 However, the names of the suspected officials, private people or companies would not 
be found in the report, because of their right to protection of privacy and presumption 
of innocence.120 
The Committee on Budgetary Control instructed its Chair Diemut Theato to draw up a 
report on the handling of documents the Commission forwarded to Parliament. These 
reports were needed so the Parliament could control the execution of the EU budget. 
Mrs. Theato stressed that the European Commission was not to make a prior 
“selection” of the documents it provided to the Parliament. Parliament was entitled to 
and needed access to all the documents, as “the one being examined must not decide 
on what it will be examined”, Mrs. Theato said. The Commission could not expect to 
receive the discharge “automatically”. Mrs. Theato recalled that the Parliament had 
postponed the discharge earlier.121  
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In the evening of Monday 19 October 1998 in Strasbourg, the Committee on Budgets 
was to vote over what to do with 330 million euros maintained in reserve. James Elles 
(British Conservative) thought that Mr. Santer had made progress. Elles said President 
Santer had “fulfilled the conditions” set by parliament. He would recommend that his 
group (EPP) vote at first reading on 22 October at the plenary session, for the release 
of the ECHO credits. This is a “significant victory” for the European Parliament, 
which has always called for greater transparency. 
Gianfranco Dell `Alba (European Radical Alliance, Italy) wanted the credits to be 
released as well. He railed against the “blackmail at the expense of one of the most 
significant programmes implemented by the EU in six years”. 
Hevre Fabre – Aubrespy was also very critical (on behalf of the Europe of Nations 
group) of the “tactics” used by the European Parliament Committee on Budgets with 
regard to humanitarian aid and the use of reserves. “I do not agree to taxpayers, i.e. 
Member States, being taken hostage”, he said. 
Edith Müller welcomed the dropping of “all legal reservations” by the Commission. 
From her viewpoint the Commission had used legal reservations to justify its decision 
not to make certain documents available to Parliament. However, according to Mrs. 
Müller, Mr. Santer `s latest statements were not enough. This was the reason why Mrs. 
Müller wanted to keep 30% of the funds in question in reserve. This would enable The 
Committee on Budgetary Control to examine in detail the content of Mr. Santer `s 
letter and its implications. “Tell Mr. Santer that there is no worse lie than half-truths”, 
Juan Manuel Fabra Valles exclaimed. By that he supported Mrs. Müller `s scepticism. 
The Commission gave Mr. Fabra Valles access to the files he wanted, but he was not 
given the assistance of a translator. He also criticised the Commission for not wanting 
to mention the names of the officials involved. There was no point in keeping them 
secret, when their names were all over the newspapers, according to Mr. Fabra 
Valles.122     
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2.3. Process number 3: A: A Refusal to Give Discharge for the Budget of 1996. 
 
In Mr. Santer `s December speech, he also addressed the matter of transparency in the 
ECHO case. From his point of view, he had forwarded all the documents to the 
European Parliament. However, respect for the principle of sub justice123 and 
individuals rights to protect their private life, was of the utmost importance. The 
ECHO dossier had been made available to the Chair of the relevant parliamentary 
committee and to Parliamentary reporters. Therefore the transparency was complete 
within the limits of sub justice and individual rights. Mr. Santer enhanced the need for 
a constructive spirit between Parliament and Commission. To make the constructive 
spirit stronger, Mr. Santer offered to establish a code of conduct. 
By giving the Parliament the information of the ECHO case and by offering to create 
new codes of conduct, Mr. Santer saw no reason why the 1996 budget would not 
receive discharge. He considered that “all the objective reasons are there to grant the 
Commission its discharge” for the 1996 budget.124   
 
Mrs. Aelvoet, President of the Green Group in the European Parliament, declared that 
her group regarded it “unacceptable” that the EP should grant the Commission 
discharge for the 1996 budget, given the cases of suspected fraud. She had been given 
a document of an official, which she in turn handed to the press.125 The official, an 
assistant at the Commission `s Financial Control Unit, believed it was his duty “as a 
loyal official and a Christian” to pass the document on to Mrs. Aelvoet. The document 
allegedly states that the Commission has systematically passed on instances of fraud as 
“irregularities” and has refrained from prosecuting the officials held responsible by the 
institutions `s own anti-fraud unit UCLAF.126 The document implies that an Internal 
Memoranda by the Financial Control Unit ordered the internal Auditors to limit their 
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scope of investigations in the ECHO case. Hence, the irregularities continued.127 
Aelvoet said that the allegations were so serious that she could not rule out a 
Parliamentary motion of censure against the institution. This confirms my view that 
the Commission is withholding information from the European Parliament and 
suppressing information internally,” she said.128 
Magda Aelvoet therefore stated that the Commission had not forwarded all available 
information to the European Parliament Committee on Budgetary Control and that 
certain investigations had allegedly been hushed up. 
Mr. Santer replied to these allegations in a letter to European Parliament President Jose 
Maria Gil Robles. Mr. Santer wrote: “ If the European Parliament Committee on 
Budgetary Control deems it useful, Mrs. Ventura, Financial Controller at the 
Commission, and Mr. Knudsen, Director of UCLAF, are available on Thursday to 
present any clarifications needed on the matters in question, on which the Commission 
has taken the occasion to provide exhaustive information to the European Parliament 
on several occasions, moreover.”129    
 
Pauline Green, the leader of the Socialist Group at the European Parliament, had 
exchanged letters with President Santer on the subject of the “culture” of the European 
Commission. She particularly enhanced the public `s perception of the European 
Commission, its culture and its management ethos. The view of her Group was that 
“the relationship between the Parliament and the Commission should be placed on a 
more mature footing.” Pauline Green argued that the climate between the two 
institutions at that time concerning fraud and mismanagement had been “exacerbated 
by the perception of an insecure, defensive and secretive culture”. Further she argued 
that there is an obvious need to develop a more uniform administrative culture within 
the European bureaucracy. She stated the need for Mr. Santer to describe how the 
Commission, under his Presidency, “has acted to develop a strategy for change”. 
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In Mr. Santer `s reply he explained that he had initiated several reforms in 1995, the 
very same year he arrived in Brüssels. Since the end of 1980s the Commission got new 
responsibilities. They were inexperienced in handling these tasks. He admitted that 
these new tasks and lack of experience “has at times led us to improvise”. 
Also: “because our administration is made up of many nationalities and has had to face 
rapid change, there is naturally a need to reassess and anticipate that change.” He 
concluded by writing: “I have always believed that the Parliament and the Commission 
should be allies in the process of European unification. Each of us has its own role to 
play. I hope that this can be done in the spirit of openness, confidence and mutual 
respect”.130   
 
The European Parliament Committee on Budgetary Control voted 14 to 13 to give the 
Commission discharge for the 1996 budget.131 Those in favour of discharge included 7 
socialist, 4 EPP, 1 ERA and 2 Liberal Group members. Those against included 2 
socialists, 6 EPP, 1 Green, 2 UFE, and 1 Liberal Group member. The CoCobu 
recommended that the EP would grant the Commission discharge for the 1996 budget. 
However, they called for Commission initiatives on issues like:  
- Setting in place the independent Anti- Fraud Office according to the guidelines 
of the Bösch report.  
- The presentation of a draft on code of conduct for the appointment of senior 
officials.132   
The following debate in the European parliament all together, was also very 
divergent. They had requested further information from the Commission about 
several points. Two of these were issues about the fight against fraud within the 
Commission and the bad management of foreign policy programmes. 
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 In the debate about the 1996 budget, Mrs. Green referred to her correspondence 
with Mr. Santer. She claimed the debate went beyond the question whether to give 
discharge to the 1996 budget or not. The important issue was not just the budget 
itself, but the Commission `s “culture” that is “defensive, insecure and secretive”. 
She further stated that fifteen “national cultures” coexisted within the European 
Commission, which had been unable to develop a “European administrative 
culture”. However, if the European Parliament refused the discharge, this would 
mean that they considered the Commission to be financially incompetent. “The next 
logical step would then be to table a motion of censure”. This was not a desirable 
situation as it was the Commission who had opened up to the Parliament. The 
Commission had “enabled us to identify some of the problems,” Mrs. Green stated. 
Furthermore, her Group did not work on “leaked information”; “it `s irresponsible 
to accept such information without verifying it”. About 75% of the Socialists would 
vote in favour of the discharge, Mrs. Green suggested. 
 It was pointed out to her that Klaus Hänsch (German Social Democrat)133, had said 
that the Commission should resign. Mrs. Green replies that the vote of the Socialist 
Group on this issue was “very clear”, and that “Klaus knows it now”, even if he 
obviously may have another opinion than that of the majority.134 
Mr. Elles accused the President of the Socialist Group, Pauline Green, of misleading 
her Group. She supposedly said that refusing the discharge amounted to “sacking 
the Commission”. Mr.Elles opposed this statement and said that refusing the 
discharge was not the same thing as a motion of censure. Mr. Elles thought refusing 
discharge would mean that in the coming months the Commission would have to 
modernise according to suggestions made by the Parliament. According to Mr. Elles 
the issue of discharge for the 1996 budget divided the political groups within 
themselves. In this case the division tended to follow “national “guidelines. Not 
political guidelines. Mr. Elles also made the point that the division on this issue had 
also been reflected in the European Parliament Budgetary Control Committee `s 
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vote in favour of discharge. Only one vote had swung the decision in favour of 
discharge.135  
 
Pieter Dankert (Socialist, Netherlands) noted that the Commission had responded to 
three of Parliament `s demands, and that “Commissioner Liikanen has conducted 
himself particularly well”. “We cannot expect the Commission to solve the problems 
of staff and access to information in a matter of months”. He wanted the discharge to 
be postponed, but not rejected. He believed that only a vote of “censure makes a 
sanction possible”. Technicalities should not dictate politics, which would be badly 
received in the public. 
Gianfranco Dell `Alba (Italian, Radical) was also worried about what the public would 
think. Refusing discharge would send out a negative signal to the Commission, and the 
Member States and the public, just days before the introduction of the single 
currency”. The vote itself over discharging the 1996 budget would be sufficiently 
critical, Dell `Alba said. 
Commissioner Erkii Liikanen gave reasons why the Parliament ought to vote in favour 
of discharge. He argued that the Commission had taken note of the Parliaments 
critique and especially that of Mr. Elles. Mr. Liikanen made it clear that he stood 
behind the draft by the Commission President to the European Parliament on 2 
December 1998 concerning the fraud prevention office. The draft was also confirmed 
by the Vienna summit. The Commission had also worked hard on improving the ties 
between Commissioners, cabinets and their services. 
The Commission was preparing a code of conduct and was about to create a charter of 
ethics for officials. 
 
Dietmut Theato spoke on behalf of the EPP. She expressed that certain demands would 
have to be met. “We should have had circumstantial information on ECHO and 
UCLAF” without the guarantee that the Commission will address the national justice 
systems in suspected cases of fraud. Therefore it is a matter of credibility “ We cannot 
have full confidence in the Commission when funds are not being well used”. 
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Jean-Lois Bourlange `s (EPP) point was that discharge had to be refused because 
accepting the budget would put an end to the investigations. They still did not have all 
the facts, so the investigations would have to continue. The Parliament did not have to 
refuse to grant discharge forever, but more information was needed, Jean-Lois 
Bourlanges explained.  
The Liberal Group `s opinions was not clear either. The Liberal Group was split down 
the middle, and Pat Cox had avoided instructing the others on what to vote. 
Personally the President of the Liberal Group, Pat Cox; was in favour of granting 
discharge. A refusal would be politically serious and in “this period of the most intense 
negotiations for ten years over Agenda 2000, I would not like the Commission to be 
weakened”.136   
The result of the debates was that on 17 December 1998, the Parliament refused to 
grant the Commission discharge for the 1996 budget. The fact that the parliament 
voted no, seriously triggered the debate weather individual Commissioners should 
have to resign. 137    
 
2.4. Process number 3:B: Motion of censures.  
 
Immediately after the rejection of the 1996 budget, the Socialist Group of the 
European Union launched a motion of censure. 
However, they intended to vote against their own proposal, to restore confidence in the 
Commission. A spokesman of the Socialist group stated that the situation had been 
improved. The Commission had promised to set up an independent investigation office 
and draw up a code of conduct on relations between Commissioners and the 
directorates-general.138  
Mr. Santer responded to questions about what the Commission would do if the motion 
of censure gained a large number of votes. “ As President of the Commission, I have to 
stick to the institutional functioning of the treaties”. He continued: “I possibly regret 
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that the Commission cannot itself ask for a vote of confidence”. He added: “We are 
intent on fully respecting the provisions of the Treaty. If the motion of censure is 
rejected, the Commission will continue, of course: there are no institutional provisions 
that oblige us to step down.”139  
Mr. Santer reminded the press that he had decided “for a long time now to pave the 
way for the Commission of tomorrow”. “I can guarantee that I shall leave a tidy house 
for the future president”. He admitted to “ we have had management difficulties “. 
“But to put into question the whole and indiscriminate action of the Commission is 
frankly intolerable”.140  
 
The Liberal Group and the European People `s Party Group did not find the Socialist 
`s motion for censure, appropriate. James Elles (British Conservative and member of 
the EPP Group) declared that the Socialist motion “only aims to prevent an open 
debate with the Commission”, and, in fact, “its only purpose seems to be to protect 
some Commissioners who are responsible for policy areas where fraud and 
irregularities have been discovered”. 
Pat Cox from the Liberal Group expressed that whereas his Group “may be unwilling 
to press the button on a nuclear device which could involve the dismissal of the entire 
Commission”, it was prepared to “single out individual Commissioners for criticisms”. 
The Liberals saw the Socialist Group `s suggestion as hasty, as it did not leave any 
time for reflection on political strategy. 
Both of these groups saw another option. Individual Commissioners could be held 
responsible, and not necessarily the Commission as a whole. 
Mr. Boge (German Christian –Democrat. CDU-CSU component of the EPP) expressed 
this when he said that even if there were no personal culpability, the Commissioners 
had to assume their political responsibility and stop hiding behind collegiality. “When 
there are two bad apples in a basket, you don `t throw the whole basket away, but nor 
do you leave them there”. Should the Commission not respect the will thus expressed 
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by Parliament, the latter should draw the consequences with a vote of censure in April, 
said Mr. Boge.141 
 
At a press conference on 7 January 1999, Pauline Green (Britsh Labour MEP) 
defended the Socialist Group `s motion of censure. The Socialist Group would not 
hesitate in censuring the Commission, but there was no proof. She argued that her 
political group had always been very active in the fight against fraud. Irregularities had 
been found in many cases, in agricultural policy and also in the Tacis and Phare 
programmes. This time only Socialist Commissioners had been targeted. Pauline 
Green wondered why. Why were the other Commissioners spared? She claimed that 
there were people in Parliament who tried to take scalps of certain persons. She said 
she did not believe in this approach, as, if the Commission was considered guilty, she 
had to go as a whole.142  
 
As Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder were to be President of the European Council and 
German ministers were to chair the different EU Councils in the first half of 1999, 
President Santer had a meeting with him. Following the meeting, there was a press 
conference where Chancellor Schroeder gave certain signals. Mr. Schroeder said it 
was in the German Presidency `s interest to have a “stable Commission, capable of 
acting”. President Santer had made it clear that all the accusations levelled at the 
Commission would be clarified. “I `m very pleased at this”, said Chancellor 
Schroeder. To this end, Mr. Schroeder had suggested a group made up of 
representatives from the Council, Commission and Parliament, should be formed. This 
group “should guide” this work of “control” over possible irregularities, “calmly”. 
Chancellor Schroeder thought this group would show that “in Europe, there is nothing 
to hide”. Chancellor Schroeder was asked whether the Commission `s stability would 
be assured even if two Commissioners were to leave. Mr. Schroeder clearly stated that 
he saw the Commission as a single “entity”. He was also confronted with the question: 
Is it true that you have advised European Social –Democrat MEPs not to vote on the 
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motion of censure? Chancellor Schroeder replied that he had too much respect for 
Parliament to give advice to Members of the European Parliament, “at leased in 
public”. He added that what counted now was to look at the future and prevent the 
“engine of the Union from racing out of control.”143    
The Europe of Nations group in the European Parliament did not consider the Socialist 
Group `s motion of censure as real. They decided to launch their own motion of for 
censure and Mr. Fabre-Aubrespy called it a “true motion of censure”. 
The reason for this motion of censure was according to Fabre-Aubrespy, management 
practices not approved by the Court of Auditors and numerous cases of suspected 
fraud. He criticised the Commission for never having responded to Parliaments 
requests. The formal explanation for the motion of censure states that Parliament 
refused to give the Commission discharge for implementation of the 1996 budget and 
that, for three years, the Court of Auditors has refused the declaration of assurance on 
management of the budget. The Commission was accused of failing to take follow –up 
action on Parliament `s requests and refusing to forward to it certain fundamental 
documents. 144 
  
Both motions of censure were debated in the Parliament. 
Pat Cox spoke on behalf of the Liberal Group. Cox stressed the fact the Commission is 
not simply a group of officials, but a political body whose collegial nature is founded 
on the concept of collective responsibility. “In a national government, the resignation 
of a minister at fault is seen not as a weakness of the system, but as a strength. Why 
should it be any different for the Commission?” With this background information, he 
urged the two Commissioners to “consider their position” and accept their 
responsibilities.145  
The British Conservative James Elles in the European People `s Party group wrote a 
resolution in which he stated that the Commission should adopt several points. The 
Commission should for example establish an anti-fraud bureau in accordance with the 
recommendations of the Bösch report. The Commission should also present a draft 
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code of conduct for appointment of high-level civil servants. This should increase 
transparency and responsibility, define minimum qualifications and establish explicit 
rules of incompatibility and safeguard against pressure from national administrators.146  
Wilfried Martens, also a member of European People `s Party, came up with different 
arguments. From his viewpoint the Socialist Group were trying to conceal the 
responsibility of certain Commissioners. He realised that the Commission had to face a 
heritage of poor management, but voting for censure would not necessarily be the way 
out of the crisis. President Santer and his Commission had to work hard to re-earn 
Parliament `s confidence, particularly through the fight against fraud. In the process of 
re-earning Parliament `s confidence, Mr. Martens asked President Santer to present a 
detailed plan on how and when to reform the Commission `s procedures.147  
The Green Group asked for the same measures as EPP had lined up. They made it 
clear that they would vote for the motion of censure. They called for a “viable” 
solution to be made regarding Mr. Marin. They also stressed the importance of getting 
the necessary information from the Commission.148  
Jean-Claude Pasty, Chair of the Union for Europe Group, stated that the Socialist 
motion of censure was a farce. It was staged to take away the attention of the vote on 
the discharge in December and the political significance of this act. Mr. Pasty argued 
that even though mismanagement was already in existence, it did not justify the 
Commissions actions. Mismanagement of the past could not be the reason why the 
Commission refused to take the initiative of playing the game of transparency. He 
added: “If investigations demonstrate that Commissioners failed to fulfil their duties, 
the Commission must ask them to step down if it does not want to see Article 160 
invoked”. “If officials, regardless of their grade, are at fault, the required disciplinary 
sanctions must be taken.” “We are asking the Commission for a radical change,” 
concluded Mr. Pasty. 
 
Mrs. Pauline Green explained again her group `s strategy: the motion of censure was 
tabled to enable Parliament to reject it and thus to express its confidence in the 
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Commission. The point was to end the crisis. The crisis would end when Parliament 
considered the Commission capable of doing its job. Even though she respected those 
who sincerely believed that the Commission no longer deserved Parliament `s 
confidence, she criticised the electioneering motivations of certain Members of 
Parliament. A negotiating framework between Parliament and the Commission for a 
reform of the Commission `s management procedures, was needed. Unproven charges 
against individual Commissioners, was not.149 
President Santer asked the Members of Parliament to evaluate the Commission and its 
work as a whole, and said: “What we are debating is the question of confidence 
between the our two institutions. This confidence has come under pressure lately. I am 
ready to bear my share of responsibility for this. The time is manifestly ripe for 
clarification. I say this because I have the deepest respect for the European Parliament 
`s institutional role. Over the past four years, I have come to realise just how important 
the relationship of trust between our two institutions is for the European Union. Our 
resent success would not have been possible without close cooperation between the 
European Parliament and the Commission. I am convinced that the Members of the 
House will judge the Commission on its activities as a whole, on its action as a body. I 
shall endeavour to show that this house would be right to express its confidence, and 
its confidence is essential if the Union `s ambitious programme for the months ahead is 
to be carried through.” 
He continued: “In January 1995, I referred to one area where a special effort was 
needed: internal management (…) We have undertaken more by way of reform in the 
last four years than in the forty years that went before (…) The improvements in 
UCLAF `s work have also brought to light a number of cases involving Commission 
Officials. Each of these cases hurts me. Each time it is Europe that looses out. We 
have been criticised for the way we handled the affairs. I can assure you that there was 
no ill intention on our part. We wee not out to hide anything. I have been in public life 
for thirty years. I have always regarded it as a privilege and something that demands 
absolute integrity. I treat the taxpayer `s money with utmost respect. Anyone found 
                                                 
149 Bulletin Quotidien Europe No 7381 Wednesday 13 January 1999 p.3. 
 59
guilty of fraud must be punished. We need Parliament `s help. With it, my 
determination will be much greater.”150 
 
The Socialist Group `s motion of censure was withdrawn just before the vote on 14 
January 1999. The resolution set forward by the Socialistic Group, the United Left and 
the Radical Alliance were they demanded an investigation by an independent group of 
experts, had gained sufficient support. Pauline Green considered the resolution a major 
success, which would not have been possible without their motion of censure. Hence, 
the motion of censure was no longer required.151  
President Santer commented on this resolution demanding an independent group of 
experts to investigate the allegations of fraud: “ The European Parliament has just 
expressed itself in a resolution that sends a clear and firm message to the Commission. 
It will, presently, state its position, in full sovereignty, on the issue of confidence. This 
is an important moment in the life of our institutions. I should first like to say a word 
about the resolution. As I have said, the message to the Commission is clear and I am 
receiving it loud and clear. I take to heart the criticism expressed. I undertake today to 
bring to a successful conclusion the ambitious programme I have proposed, in 
accordance with a tight timetable, and to take action on the demands of this 
Parliament. I see this experience a means of giving the necessary reforms a very strong 
impetus. The European Parliament has forcefully reiterated today its authority and its 
role of control. As democrats we must welcome this. I should also like to say 
something about the idea of the Committee of Wise. I accept it because it will enable 
us to have a close look at our methods, to improve our management, to take a critical 
look at the effort to combat fraud. It is obvious that this Committee may also examine 
certain individual cases. I say so clearly: the recommendations of the Committee of 
Wise will be put into practice. Moreover, it goes without saying that the Commission 
will continue to report to the European Parliament `s control bodies. I can assure you 
that every case of fraud hurts me. Europe is the real looser in every case. Certain 
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blunders have been committed. I recognise this. We have been criticised. But our good 
will has never been called into questions”.152   
       
A draft resolution tabled by the European People `s Party, Liberals and Greens, 
demanding the resignation of Edith Cresson and Manuel Marin, was rejected. In 
Cresson `s case 165 voted in favour, 357 voted against and 13 abstained. In Marin `s 
case 155 voted in favour, 364 voted against and 23 abstained. 
The Europe of Nations Group motion of censure was also rejected by 232 in favour, 
293 against and 27 abstained.153  
 
2.5. Process number: 3:C: The Committee of Independent Experts. 
 
Several MEPs expressed reservation about the creation of a Committee of Experts, and 
some insisted on the need to clarify the relationship between their own responsibilities 
and those of the independent committee of experts. Magda Aelvoet, Chair of the 
Greens Group, was perplex regarding the role of the “Wise”(Committee of Experts). 
She stated this to the EP `s Committee on Institutional Affairs. She argued that the 
resolution made by the Socialist, the United Left and Radical Alliance gave the 
committee of experts a function of control. This means institutional problems, she 
argued. She asked her fellow MEPs whether they were committing themselves to “new 
institutional waters”, by forming this committee. 
Fernand Herman, Belgian Christian-Democrat, disagreed. Given the fact that the 
committee of experts were limited in time and they should have their report ready   
March 15, it would not be a problem.    
Antoinette Spaak, Belgian member of the Liberal Group, said that she had “ too high 
an opinion of the European Commission” to be in favour of the establishment of a 
group of experts. When speaking with the Commissioners themselves they seemed “ 
incredible divided over this subject”. Some would think it will be “ work done fast, 
superficially, and therefore not really necessary”. Others would argue that the 
                                                 
152 Bulletin Quotidien Europe No 7383 Friday 15 January 1999 p.5 
153 Bulletin Quotidien Europe No 7383 Friday 15 January 1999 p.3-4 
 61
committee should write “ a document that goes to the very end”. This would 
compromise the Commission `s dignity, Spaak argued. 
From the British Conservative `s perspective all the members of the Committee of the 
Wise should be appointed by the European Parliament, and not just half of them. The 
people in the committee needed to be free of all influence from the Commission, 
James Provan stated. The candidates ought to be picked from the EU Court of Justice 
or similar institutions. This would ensure that the members of the committee had the 
legal capacity, but also an investigative background. It would come in handy if they 
were to expose what Provan saw as a culture of “cover-up” in the Commission. EU 
taxpayers did not trust a Socialist pact with Jacques Santer, the British Conservatives 
expressed. 
Dietmut Theato, EPP and Chair of the Committee on Budgetary Control, opposed to 
set up this group of experts, because it “devalues” the parliamentary committee on 
budgetary control. “I vote against this resolution but, as a Democrat, I am now waiting 
to see what the work of this group will be”. She thought judges and eminent lawyers 
would be best suited for the committee.154  
 
In the debate concerning the composition of the committee, Pauline Green made 
certain statements to the press. If the inquiries revealed cases of “abuse of personal 
powers by anyone”, these people would be “dismissed”. The Committee should be 
made up of people not only with experience in legal matters or financial control, but 
also in the “ethics of public life”. The experts should not be involved in the work of 
the Commission or European Parliament and it should not be a question of a “political 
party nomination”.  
Suggestions were made about handling this affair over to an EP committee of Enquiry. 
Mrs. Green replied that the Committee of Experts would be more independent, 
because “in the run up to the European elections”, a parliamentary committee risked 
falling into “party politics”.155      
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On the European Parliament Conference of Presidents (The President of the EP Gil-
Robles and the Presidents of each political group) they decided that there should be 5 
members in the committee. These experts should be chosen on the basis of their: - 
political, professional and institutional independence; their knowledge of European 
institutions and financial regulations; - legal and / or economic expertise and / or 
auditing expertise. Their report should contain how the Commission detects and treats 
cases of fraud, mismanagement and nepotism, and also include a review of how the 
Commission awards financial contracts. From this one should be able to derive to what 
extent the Commission as a whole or individual Commissioners can be considered 
responsible for fraud or irregular management.156  
 
After the meeting on 27 January 1999, President José Maria Gil-Robles announced the 
composition of the Committee of Independent Experts. The Conference of Presidents 
chose: - Inga-Britt Ahlenius (Sweden), Auditor General at the Court of Auditors since 
1993. She had also served as Head of the Budget Department of Sweden `s Finance 
Ministry from 1987 to 1993 and President of the European organisation of audit 
institutions from 1993 to 1996. 
- Juan Antonio Carrillo Salcedo, member of the European Commission of Human 
Rights from 1979 to 1985 and of the European Court of Human Rights from 
1985 to 1990 and at the time Professor of International Law at Seville 
University. 
- Pierre Lelong (France), member and then President of the European Court of 
Auditors from 1977 to 1989 and President of the French Court of Auditors since 
1994. 
- André Middelhock (Netherlands) President of the European Court of Auditors 
from 1977 to 1996, Director General for the budget at the Netherlands `Finance 
Ministry from 1969 to 1977. 
- Walter Van Gerven (Belgium) Advocate General at the EU Court of Justice 
from 1988 to 1994, at the time practicing attorney and professor at the 
University of Louvain. 
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  President Gil-Robles explained that the experts themselves would be in control of 
organisation and divide the work. They could gather information in Brüssels and work 
elsewhere if they wanted. The experts were to present their report on 15 March 1999 to 
the President of Parliament and the President of the Commission. Mr. Gil-Robles 
stressed that both the European Parliament and the Commission had to guarantee 
unrestricted access to any document the committee requested, including those 
examined by UCLAF. 
 Officials and other agents of the Commission consulted by the Committee of 
Independent Experts or who wished to reveal information would not be bound by the 
conditions of confidentialities, Mr. Gil-Robles informed. He also informed that the 
experts would be paid by the European Parliament, but there would be held 
negotiations with the Commission on possible cost sharing.      
Mr. Gil-Robles stated that President Santer had made no objections to the list of 
experts. President Santer had also made it clear that it was up to the experts to derive at 
a conclusion. They would have to choose the path to a conclusion themselves. 
President Santer was asked whether the Commissioners called into question by the 
experts `conclusion would resign. He said that he was “convinced” that individuals 
whose behaviour had been questioned by a “committee of this type” “would be well 
advised to come to their own conclusions”. If they did not, the Parliament would have 
to decide how to proceed.157 
  
At a press conference, Hervé Fabre-Aubrespy from the Europe of Nations Group said 
that he was the only one to vote against Mr. Gil-Robles `proposal. The Conference of 
Presidents had not examined the entire list of candidates, he objected. He had made 
suggestions, but the candidate that he wanted had been rejected. According to Hevré 
Fabre-Aubrespy the process of selection of experts “shocking”. He commented on the 
candidates who were selected and remarked that: several members of the committee 
have “a marked commitment and political career” and are therefore not independent 
enough. He stressed that three members were former members of Community 
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institutions (the Court of Justice and Court of Auditors), which “detracts from their 
freedom of thought and judgement”. “Sufficient experience in auditing and procedures 
for awarding of financial contracts”, seemed to be lacking from the experts 
competence. Their mandate was also inconsistent of the resolution adopted on 14 
January by the European Parliament. In Mr. Fabre-Aubrespy `s opinion the mandate 
and the composition of the committee “confirm that the European Parliament does not 
really want to give itself the means to shed sufficient light on issues related to the 
Commission `s financial management”. Mr. Fabre-Aubrespy concluded: “We are 
worried about the process bogging down”. 
The Green Group and the British Conservatives criticised the decisions made by the 
Conference of Presidents. The Greens expressed doubts about the need for the 
Committee. Still, they made suggestions about who to pick as members. Their 
suggestions had been rejected.158  
However, Mrs. Aelvoet expressed satisfaction with the ones who were picked. She 
was glad that one of the experts was a woman. The most important objection was 
concerning the committee `s mandate. Mrs. Aelvoet feared that the mandate could 
keep the experts from working on cases were legal proceedings were on the way. 
“This would mean that the Committee could not touch 11 out of 27 known cases of 
fraud and irregularities. It is a classic tactic by bodies under scrutiny to conceal the 
whole truth”, Mrs. Aelvoet said. The Greens would try to “clarify if there is really 
legal ground for excluding some of the cases of fraud and irregularities from 
investigation by the Committee”.159  
Edward McMillan-Scott accused Pauline Green of cooperating with the Commission 
to create a powerless committee in order to evade the motion of censure.160  
 
As the Committee of Experts started to work, the critics from the Green Group grew 
stronger. The Green Group argued that based on analysis made by Joe Verhoeren 
(Professor of Community of Law at the Catholic University of Louvain) that the 
constitution of the Committee of Independent Experts had no legal basis. In Law, it 
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had no powers to proceed with verifications or to summon witnesses. Thus it was 
totally dependent on the good will of the European Commission. Even though the 
Green Group would not have asked for the dissolution of the committee because of its 
support from the majority of the Parliament, they would have preferred a solution 
within the framework of an inter-institutional agreement. A temporary committee with 
powers defined by the treaty, would have been more in line with the Green Group `s 
wishes. Magda Aelvoet said that it was necessary to clarify the Committee `s 
powers.161 Later she compared the committee to “a little fragile boat launched into a 
tempest”. She commented on the members of the committee `s remunerations, and said 
she understood those who found the amounts astronomic. The experts were supposedly 
to receive 9650 Euros a month and 300 Euros per head per day. Hevré Fabre-Aubrespy 
referred to remuneration of 29200 Euros, and asked President Gil-Robles whether the 
sum was correct or not.162                     
 
While everyone was waiting for the report to be ready, Members of Parliament made 
certain statements. Gunther Rinsch and Ingo Friedrich from the CDU/CSU delegation 
within the EPP stressed the individual responsibility of the Commissioners. 
Independent of the results of the report, both Edith Cresson and Manuel Marin should 
have to resign. If other Commissioners had made serious mistakes, they should resign 
as well, Rinsche and Friedrich demanded. 
Pat Cox (Liberals) said that the report should cause the Commissioners to reflect and 
act accordingly. Should Commissioners pointed out by the report choose not to act, 
The Commission should make them understand that they had to. If not, it would be up 
to the Parliament to act for them.163  
President Santer was also eager to receive the report: “On behalf of the College, I 
backed and welcomed the constitution of the Committee of Independent Experts. It `s 
brief is clear: examine how the Commission deals with cases of mismanagement, fraud 
and nepotism. The report will be made public Monday evening. The committee has 
worked professionally and objectively. The Commission will follow-up its 
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recommendations, whether they concern the general running of the Commission or the 
conduct of individual members of the College. I undertake this personally. I refuse to 
speculate on the outcome of the work of the Committee. I have convened an 
extraordinary meeting of the College for Monday evening to consult my colleagues 
before taking any decision”.164  
The report was set forward at 17:00 pm on 15 March 1999. The very same night 
President Santer made a statement on behalf of the College: “In the light of the report 
of the Committee of Independent Experts, the Members of the Commission decided 
this evening unanimously to present collectively their resignation. The Commission 
thus assumes its responsibilities, in accordance with its commitment to act on the 
report by the Committee of Independent Experts. Tomorrow (i.e. Tuesday) I shall 
inform The European Parliament Conference of Presidents and make a statement on 
behalf of the Commission at the conclusion of this conference meeting”.  
The following morning, Jaques Santer explained: “I promised that we would act on 
the report by the Committee of Independent Experts. Yesterday the Commission 
assumed its responsibilities. I would like to say a few things on its behalf. 
1. The report considers a small number of specific cases which have recently 
attracted criticism from the European parliament. The cases are analysed in 
great detail and, while the findings reveal certain malfunctions and one 
instance of favouritism, I would point out that there is no suggestion that any 
Member of the Commission was involved in fraud or corruption or stood to 
gain personally. 
2. I note that on the basis of a tiny number of cases of fraud and malfunctioning, 
which did indeed merit criticism, the Committee `s report paints a picture of 
total absence of responsibility on the part of the institutions and its officials. 
This picture is distorted. I consider the tone of the report `s conclusions to be 
wholly unjustified.  
3. I do not accept that four weeks of work, during which this Commission has 
achieved its full policy program, can be reduce to six cases of irregularities, 
four of which date back to before 1995. I would also have hoped that the 
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Committee of Independent Experts might have attached appropriate 
significance to the very substantial reforms carried out by this Commission 
since 1995 and the ambitious programme announced to parliament last 
January. 
4. The Commission `s decision yesterday was a political act. We have taken our 
responsibilities, even if we judge the report to be imbalanced. 
             Sometime criticism can be salutary; we must use this crisis as a catalyst for a  
             deep and lasting reform in all the European institutions. I have informed the          
             President of the European Council of the decision taken yesterday. I pointed   
             out to him that, in line with the Treaties, we will continue to perform our 
             functions until our replacement is provided for under the relevant  
             procedures.” 
  
After giving the official statements, Mr. Santer made some personal remarks. He 
was satisfied with the fact that the report “exonerated me entirely”. This gave him 
“the necessary credibility and dignity”. He was asked about criticism relating to the 
Commission `s security office. Mr. Santer said he was not responsible for events 
dating back to 1993. Adding: “Ask my predecessor as well!” When confronted with 
statements about the Commission resigning to late, Mr. Santer stated: “One is 
always more intelligent with hindsight”. He had acted “in political determined 
circumstances” and the resignation was the result. “Political honesty and 
honourability require me to draw the consequences, even if I cannot say that I agree, 
especially with the report `s horizontal conclusions”. 
Mr. Santer addressed the press directly and said that the Commission had in some 
cases, been the victim of “harassment, notably by some of you”, whereas the report 
completely exonerated, among others Vice-President Marin and Emma Bonino. As 
a result the Commission had to “seek clarification in an unhealthy climate”. He was 
asked how he thought the Member States would react, and he answered: “I am 
certain; knowing my European Council colleagues, that they will concur with my 
assessments” of the report `s general conclusion. However, Mr. Santer mentioned 
one area where he and the Council did not see eye to eye. Mr. Santer was referring 
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to the budget and said there was “inappropriate means and human resources in 
relation to the responsibilities” entrusted to the Commission by the Council. Still, 
the EU humanitarian aid was the worlds highest. 
Some national governments made statements about the Commission `s resignation. 
The Government of United Kingdom declared its total confidence in the two British 
Commissioners Sir Leon Brittain and Neil Kinnock. The UK government confirmed 
that they would reappoint both their former Commissioners again. Mr. E. Letta 
expressed on behalf of the Italian government, both esteem and solidarity for Mrs. 
Bonino and Mr. Monti. 
The Danish Government took a different view and argued that the Commissions 
resignation was an act of logic and that it was inevitable.165            
President Gil-Robles greeted the report and said that he and all the group chairs 
welcomed the “quality, discipline, balance and levelheadedness of the report”. He 
thanked the Commission for having resigned rapidly, hence avoided censure. 
Dietmut Theato `s first remarks was that it was important that the changes were 
genuine, “introducing a culture of transparency and responsibility for the next 
Commission”. She was pleased that the Commission “has taken the report `s 
conclusions very seriously and assumed its responsibility”. Still, she “strongly 
regretted the time lost” which could have been spent on getting the reforms 
through.166 Bulletin Q. Europe No 7426 Wednesday 17 March 1999 p.14. 
Magda Aelvoet remark to the resignation of the Commission was striking:“ The 
balance of power has changed between Parliament and the Commission but the test 
of strength with the Council has not taken place yet”.                       
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Chapter 3. 
 
3.1. Neo Institutionalism. 
3.1.1. Organising structures. 
 
Looking at Processes number 1, 2 and 3 A, B, C together through a Neo Institutional 
lens some factors is more visible than others. These factors are for example the 
institution `s role and the relationship between the EP and the Commission, the rules 
and routines of the institution, the identity and loyalty of those acting and the 
organising structures of the institution and its effect on the process leading to the 
Commissions resignation. (See 1.4. Expected findings looking through a Liberal 
Intergovernmental or Neo Institutional lens in Chapter 1).   
A Neo Institutional outlook has for example an effect on how we perceive the 
Commission; by how it is organised, by which function it has and by its relationship 
towards other institutional units such as the EP and the Council of Ministers. What 
also emerges in this process is the distinction between the narrow and the broader 
meaning of the Commission. The narrow meaning refers to the 20 Commissioners 
headed by a President, a College that has a co-ordinating function. 
The Commissioners are appointed from the nation states, but without any obligations 
to be a spokesperson for their nations` interests. They each have their portfolios that 
are manifestations of specific sectors. 
In the College these tasks are co-ordinated and even though each Commissioner is 
responsible for their portfolios, they could only be censured as a group, meaning as a 
College and not be removed by the EP as individuals. Thus, the President of the 
Commission neither chose the College, nor could he remove individual 
Commissioners167. The Commission could in this process therefore be seen as “the 
political cap on a bureaucratic body”.168  
This last statement leads us to our perception of the Commission in a broader meaning 
when looking through the Neo Institutional lens. As mentioned each Commissioner is 
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responsible for a portfolio that represents a sector. A certain apparatus is at the 
Commissions disposal, such as his or her cabinet and Directorate General (DG). Each 
DG can have several directorates headed by directors; and each directorate is divided 
into three or four divisions, in turn capped by a chef de service or a head of unit169. 
The DGs are sector oriented, but institutional units that have an all-across-the board 
job do exist such as the Secretariat General. This is a horizontal organised service that 
sort of link the sector oriented DGs together. It is under the direct supervision of the 
Commission President, and is therefore an important co-ordinating tool for him. They 
help form a common Commission voice, but also routine work such as organising the 
meetings of the College of Commissioners, prepare documentation and publish agreed 
decisions and recommendations.170 Through the Neo Institutional lens organisational 
factors such as sector organisation and co-ordination elements become apparent. 
 
What also becomes apparent is the Commissions function as a supranational body that 
has the welfare of the EU as a whole at heart. 
This affects the Commissions relationship with the other institutional units such as the 
European Parliament. Some claim that since both the Commission and the European 
Parliament have supranational features they tend to work together. In fact the 
relationship between the Commission and the European Parliament is described as 
“natural allies” in the legislative process because of their common bond of 
supranationality, as compared to the more intergovernmental nature of the Council.171  
The Commission has for instance championed the cause of direct elections and has 
always represented Parliament `s point of view in Inter-Governmental Conferences 
(IGC), from which the Parliament continues to be excluded.172  
Even though the Commission produces policy proposals, they still have to take into 
account that the proposal needs a majority in the Council of Ministers.173  
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The Council of Ministers comes across as a unit with intergovernmental features 
because of the fact that it consists of representatives of the member governments 
articulating national interests.174 The relationship between the EP and the Council is 
often described as the weakest side in the triangle and the reason for this is EP `s 
alleged weak position with only advisory and supervisory powers under the Treaties of 
Rome175. The co-operation and assent procedures were added in the Single European 
Act of 1986. The Treaty on European Union (TEU) introduced the co-decision 
procedure, increasing the use of qualified majority voting.176 
As a result the EP `s position towards the Council was strengthened. 
Conflicts were not necessarily decided in favour of the Council and a tradition of Inter-
Institutional Agreements was established.177 The EP could seek an alliance with parts 
of the Council of Ministers. They try to find ministers who agree with their EP Party 
Group. Thus, weaken the intergovernmental image of the Council of Ministers by the 
help of the co-decision procedure. If an EP Party Group were successful in finding an 
alliance partner in the Council of Ministers, this would enhance the development of 
socio-political cleavages instead of national cleavages.178 The different EP Party 
Groups can also form alliances with individual Commissioners, who might have some 
party loyalty. Perhaps there is a growing tendency for individual Commissioners to see 
themselves as members of the political families. This is manifested in how some 
Commissioners prefer to deal with the EP through its Party Groups. 
Plenary weeks in Strasbourg provide the Commissioners with the opportunity to meet 
with the Group Leaders of the same political persuasion. The MEPs sometimes refers 
to their Party colleagues as “their Commissioners”. 179 
The different EP committees also have seats meant for Commissioners and Ministers 
of the Council of Ministers.180  
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3.1.2. Party Politics. 
 
From a Neo Institutional perspective there are factors that can channel the policy 
processes away from the hands of nation states towards the institution itself, thereby 
increasing the institutions impact on the decisions made in this process. 
Specifically organisational structures based on sector could have that effect, but also 
structures that promote political parties influence on the policy processes. 
In this section of my paper I will deal circumstances in this process that might have 
party implications, meaning the people involved were acting on their loyalty to a 
European Party Group. Neo Institutional spectacles allow us to see Political Parties as 
actors with an effect on the process leading to the Commissions resignation.  
 
First I will explain what I mean with Party Politics. 
There are three different levels of party families that are linked together. 
First you have the national parties in each Member State (level 1). 
Some of these holds the executive office and some are in opposition. National party 
delegations are brought together in the European Parliament and form the second 
level: the EP Party Groups in the European Parliament. The main political groups are 
The European Peoples Party (EPP), Party of European Socialists (PES), the European 
Liberal, Democratic and Reform Party (ELDR) and the Greens (G). 
Smaller Political Groups that have not existed across several parliaments are groups 
like the Union for Political Europe (UPE), the United European Left (UEL), Europe of 
the Nations (EN) and the European Radical Alliance (ERA) (level 2) 
Thirdly are the federal party groups. 
The pan – European party federation `s names are to a large extent the same as the 
party groups; EPP, PES, ELDR and the European Federation of Green Parties (EFGP) 
(level 3).181 There are also near-federations, such as the Regionalist European Free 
Alliance (EFA) and the remains of the European Democratic Union (EDU).    
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The Federal Parties emerged as think thanks were the party manifestos would be 
drafted before the first EP election in 1979182. However, I will in this paper deal with 
the EP Party Groups on the second level and that consists of national delegations 
manifested as Members of the European Parliament (MEPs).  
 
One way of evaluating EU politics is by using these axes: 
- The right-left axis 
- The supranational versus intergovernmental integration axis. 
One could claim that voting behaviour in the EP elections conforms to the second-
order model, which means that the public uses the EP elections to express 
dissatisfaction with their national government. This means that if they are unhappy 
with their Socialist or Conservative Government, they could vote for another political 
party in the EP election. As a result the EP tend to over represent small parties and 
parties of opposition. Some also end to experiment and vote for new and peripheral 
parties183.  
It is possible to differentiate between Party Groups like PES (Party of European 
Socialists) that have developed on the basis of national parties with a common 
ideology that existed before the European Union (exogenous), 
and Party Groups that has been formed to adapt to the EU as an institution and the 
Rules of the EP (endogenously).184 
From this perspective the PES seems to have been formed much on the basis of 
national party systems and still have close relationship with national parties. 
The EPP (the European Peoples Party) on the other hand is a product of the EU were 
both Christian Democrats and the Conservatives have decided to work together in one 
Party Group to have an influence on the policy processes in the EU. This is in one way 
an unnatural alliance because the Christian Democrats are normally enthusiastic about 
European Integration and the Conservatives on the other hand value national identity 
and domestic self-governance. Therefore, the institution EU and the Rules of the EP 
might have influenced the founding of the EPP and hence EU Party System. 
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The specific EP rules that makes among others the Conservatives and the Christian 
Democrats work together in one Party Group is the minimum demand of 
representative to form a Group and the Majority Rules. 
Through the Single European Act, the Maastricht Treaty and the Amsterdam Treaty 
the powers of the EP have been extended. An Absolute Majority Rule was introduced 
which meant that most powers could only be exercised on an Absolute Majority of the 
Parliaments Members and not just of those voting.185  
In practical terms this Absolute Majority Rule meant that the cost of being excluded 
from the large Party Groups increased. This created an incentive for the Party Groups 
to expand to maintain their influence in the voting process.186  
As a result the EPP needed to expand and take onboard members from different 
Ideological families from different nations.  
I believe that this meant a bigger EPP but also a stronger EPP. The EPP got strong 
enough to resist being dominated by one national party delegation from one Member 
State. 
Another Rule also seems to create an incentive to form EP Party Groups. The 
Parliament has minimum criteria for Group formation that require up to 29 MEPs if all 
MEPs come from just one member state, 23 if they come from two states, 17 if they 
come from three and 14 if they come from four states to form a Group. This is 
necessary if they want to receive certain benefits. The benefits are funding, staffing 
and an assured place in the procedures of the EP, but also the possibility of being 
appointed as a rapporteur.187  
In 1997 there were 19 Parliamentary Committees that would usually have a 
membership of between 50 and 60 MEPs. There were 101 national party delegations, 
but the national party delegations were fairly small. The average size of a national 
party delegation was just 6 members. Only 6 of the national party delegations had 
more than 20 members, or 3 per cent of the Parliament members in total.  
So most national party delegations were too few to spread all over the 19 Committees. 
That means that national delegations could miss out on policy processes that went 
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through EP Committees where they had no representatives. To avoid this situation the 
national delegations therefore forms alliances manifested as EP Party Groups. This 
makes it possible for them to have a say in all the 19 EP Committees.188   
In this sense both Christian Democrat `s and Conservative `s amalgamation in the EPP 
have been conditioned by new institutional Rules and pressures to compete within the 
EU `s own institutional system189  
These two Rules seem to have excelled the development of Party Groups in the 
European Parliament. The development of a more fixed Party system in the EP could 
strengthen the autonomy of the EU as a whole. A trans-national Party System could 
increase the likelihood of actors having loyalty towards their EP Party Group and act 
accordingly in spite of which country they come from. The trans-national Party 
division lines could be more important than national division lines. 
The evolving EU Party System could also have an affect on the relationship between 
the EP, the Council of Ministers and the Commission. 
The EP, the Commission and the Council of Ministers are to an extent open to 
representatives of other institutional units and other political processes. This makes it 
harder for the different institutional units to remain distinct and coherent, since others 
influence their institutional unit. Their ability to act coherently will have a large impact 
on their ability to bargain with other institutional units.  
In practical terms this means in the EP `s case that if they are able to create trans-
national Party Politics, the EP would be able to lead the policy processes through Party 
division lines instead of national division lines. This would strengthen the EP `s ability 
to influence the policy process, and strengthen their bargaining power and resist being 
dominated by the Commission and the Council of Ministers.  
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3.1.3. The Conference of Presidents. 
 
Apart from the European Political Groups and political division lines a certain 
institutional unit, the Conference of Presidents, stands out when looking through the 
Neo Institutional lens. 
The Conference of Presidents consists of the Chairs of each Party Group and they have 
an organising role. The Committees are in session the first two weeks of the month. 
The third week the MEPs meet in their EP Party Group parallel with the national 
delegations meetings. The fourth week all the MEPs are in Strasbourg attending the 
plenary session.190 The Conference of Presidents links the Committees, the EP Party 
Group meetings and the plenary sessions together. They set the agenda for the EP 
plenary sessions and they also allocate opportunities to draft reports to particular 
Committees. They decide which issues are going to be dealt with by which 
Committee.191 The reports are then assigned to individual MEPs called rapporteurs. 
The proportionally stronger ones EP Party Group is, the more likely it is to be picked 
as a rapporteur. The Party Groups in the Committees actually has a point system for 
weighting the importance of each report. If they disagree on who is going to be 
rapporteur, they can hold an auction and make bids. Those who bid the highest, get the 
rapporteur.192 The rapporteurs will try to negotiate an oversized majority on the 
Committee he or she is in. The rapporteur would want to get all of their EP Party 
Group Members on their side and minimise the number of EP Party Groups opposed. 
The Conference of Presidents decides which reports are ready to be voted on in the 
plenary session. They also decide in which order the reports are to be voted over by 
the plenary. 
The Conference of Presidents seems to make the final arrangements of the coalition 
building between the EP Party Groups. Here the EP Party Groups can get accurate 
information about how the others will vote and close the deal. 
In the plenary sessions in Strasbourg the eight EP Party Group Presidents announces 
their position. The Committee chairs also have their say and ordinarily members get a 
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few minutes. The speaking time in the plenary debate is spars. Therefore there is an 
incentive to choose those arguing the party line and often not all of the EP Group 
members are present. 
The EP Party Groups are together and constantly consulted by the EP Party Group `s 
leaders. It is time to make sure that the issues dealt with gain the absolute majority 
necessary. This seems to be the final test if trans-national policy can be formed and if 
the EP Party Groups can articulate a coherent political message. They need to be 
cohesive in both the plenary debate and in the final vote. More importantly, they need 
to form winning alliances with other EP Party Groups.  
The Conference of Presidents function as more than an arena for alliance building 
between the EP party groups, they are also responsible for matters related to other 
bodies of the European Union. 
Additionally, they are responsible for the composition and competence of committees 
and temporarily committees of inquiry.193  
 
3.1.4. Sector organisation in UCLAF. 
 
Using Neo Institutionalism as a mesh in the pond brings certain institutional units to 
the surface, but also their behaviour and its effect on process number 1the UCLAF 
process and number; 2 the ECHO process. UCLAF `organisational structures is 
brought to light and so is the power struggle between the Commission and the EP to 
have the new OLAF their own way. What started as a task spread over several DGs, 
was organised according to purpose in one unit, UCLAF.  The fact that UCLAF was 
sector organised is indicated by a purpose that is the basis of the unit `s activity: fight 
against fraud. 
UCLAF had a management director, Mr. Knudsen, who evaluated how many 
departments were needed to handle the workload and how much specialisation was 
needed in each division.194 The people who were hired were not only from one 
professional group, using the same work method such as a unit organised according to 
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function or process would be. Different people with different educational background, 
mostly national experts from the national ministries worked there. 
Ironically, this was a unit that was supposed to enhance co-ordination. 
Still, UCLAF was organised according to sector, an organising principle that enhances 
specialisation.195 Organising UCLAF according to sector did not only enhance 
specialisation that was supposed to increase UCLAF `s efficiency, but it also made co-
ordination more difficult. Increased specialisation could be the cause of difficulties 
with co-ordinating information from different sources for instance in the databases 
they should make according to their mandate.196 It also could have made the co-
ordination between UCLAF and the Member States cross-boarder prosecutions harder. 
UCLAF was attached to the Commission `s Secretariat-General, a unit which is 
described as an all-across-the board unit focusing on co-ordination. Even though the 
Secretariat- General perhaps has that characteristic of focusing on co-ordination, it is 
only a part of the Commission. A Commission that is to a large extent supranational 
with the institution EU `s best interest at hart. This made it even more difficult for 
Member States to be involved in the processes that ran through UCLAF, and this made 
the co-ordination between UCLAF and Member States even harder. 
It seems as though the structure of UCLAF with its focus on a specific sector made 
influence from Member States harder. It was difficult for Member States to take part in 
the investigative processes before the cases were handed over to the prosecutors in the 
nation states. This gives me the impression that the fight against fraud was a process 
dealt with mainly within EU itself with institutional units taking part as actors with 
their own agenda to maximise their own power in the fight against fraud. (See 1.4. 
Expected findings looking through a Liberal Intergovernmental or Neo institutionalism 
lens Chapter 1) 
 
What is the greater picture her from a Neo Institutional perspective? 
What was at stake was the institutions ability to clean up its own mess. The issue was 
which unit (or nation) was best suited for the job. Obviously, all actors involved would 
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not necessarily agree which institutional unit was suited for the job. It all depended on 
who was in control of the institution and its characteristics, meaning how it was 
organised and what mandate it was in possession of. The Commission claimed that 
UCLAF was best suited for handling the situation, in fact Emma Bonino tried to 
comfort people, saying that it was UCLAF `s investigation which had revealed missing 
funds in the ECHO project. (See 2.2.1. In Chapter 2.) 
The views held by MEPs were different. They expressed that in order to have 
confidence in the ongoing investigation, the UCLAF had to be freed from the 
Commission `s control. Since UCLAF was under the authority of the Secretary-
General, a new arrangement would have to be found.197 (See 2.1.3, 2.1.4. and 2.1.5. in 
Chapter 2) 
UCLAF needed more independence from the Commission it was supposed to 
investigate, the EP members expressed. 
With Neo Institutional glasses on it seems to me that the EP acted in a unified manner, 
insisting that UCLAF ties to the Commission `s Secretariat General would be 
loosened, although not cut altogether. 
It did not make the situation easier that UCLAF `s investigation was considered to be 
badly co-ordinated and highly sector organised with a lot of national experts on a 
temporary basis. This gave the UCLAF the image of being a weak institution with 
little capacity to inflict consequences on those who would misuse Community funds. 
The EP members were worried that UCLAF would be to weak to stand up to anyone 
misusing Community funds. They wanted to strengthen UCLAF and also make it more 
independent of the Commission. 
My impression from a Neo Institutional perspective is that the Member States had a 
weak influence on the processes that ran through UCLAF. However, the UCLAF got 
an image as a weak institution with difficulties fulfilling its mandate. The EP members 
were certainly convinced that UCLAF had to be strengthened to avoid a situation were 
UCLAF was dominated by the Secretariat General and thereby the Commission itself.  
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Often the Commission and the EP is seen as a team. They work together to get things 
through and they both have supranational features.198 In the matter concerning UCLAF 
this seems to have changed. The Commission and EP are adversaries, and when Bösch 
an EP representative confronts the Commission, Mr. Santer said that they had 
exceeded the EP `s requests. 
In fact it looks like the EP and the Council of Ministers are in agreement on which 
connection the new OLAF should have with the Commission and thereby rejects the 
suggestion made by the Commission that OLAF should be completely free. 
The EP switched alliances from the traditional alliance with the Commission to an 
alliance with the Council of Ministers in process nr.1; the UCLAF process. Thereby 
the Member States perception of what OLAF should be like is emerging through the 
Council of Ministers. Member State `s preferences are again on the arena in the debate 
about what the new OLAF should be like. 
I would expect the sector organisation of UCLAF to lead the policy processes within 
the institution and away from the national influence. This seems to have been the case 
for a long time. Still, because of UCLAF `s alleged weak performance, the EP as an 
institutional unit decides that this has to change. To make this change the usual 
understanding between the EP and the Commission is broken and the Council of 
Ministers and thereby the Member States is influential on how OLAF should be. 
The EP changed alliance partner from the Commission to the Council of Ministers to 
get their preferences through on how OLAF should be organised. In my Neo 
Institutional net the EP seemed to be the leading actor and creator of this strategy. 
Using this net gives me the impression that it was the EP that chose to include the 
Member States and use an Inter-Institutional Agreement. An Inter-Institutional 
Agreement is chosen as a result of EP `s increased powers. The EP let the Member 
States in through the Council on the decisions made, and EP chose them as an ally to 
get what they wanted. The decision on how to organise OLAF was a result of an 
Institutional unit `s choice, not a choice made by Member States. It also gives me the 
impression that in the power struggle between the Commission and the EP, the EP 
won and strengthened its own power to influence the decisions made. EP comes across 
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as an actor with its own agenda. (See 1.4. Expected findings looking through a Liberal 
Intergovernmental or Neo Institutional lens.) 
 
3.1.5. Management problems in ECHO. 
 
Commission staff is divided into statutory (13200 in November 1992) and non-
statutory or “external” personnel (4651 in November 1992 or 26,7 per cent of the 
total).199 In 2.2.1.Chapter 2 I described situation in ECHO were ECHO `s mandate 
expanded combined with a massive increase in ECHO `s expenditure. Simultaneously, 
the original staff left ECHO and even though new ones were hired, they were 
inexperienced.200 More importantly, they were to few to cope with the increasing 
workload. To relieve the situation a certain administrative culture rose to the existence. 
Emma Bonino openly described this culture as administrative malfunctions. 
External staff was hired. These people supposedly had contracts of a technical 
assistance character. Still, claims were made that the “external” staff were managing 
budget lines and committing the Commission in contracts with outside firms. They had 
duties giving the impression that they were civil servants, doing the same job as 
statutory staff. In addition, their salaries were funded by the operational budget, money 
that was meant for food and medicine, instead of the administrative budget. These 
operating credits were also called “mini-budgets” a phenomenon the Commission had 
worked to abolish since the early 1990s, according to Erkki Liikanen.  
Still, the “mini-budgets” phenomenon existed in February 1994 according to Karel 
Van Miert who was then responsible personnel and administration.201 (See 2.2.1. in 
Chapter 2) 
 
As I look through the Neo Institutional lens I would assume that rules and procedures 
have an effect on peoples behaviour. In the case of Process number 2: ECHO, 
there seem to be a significant gap between what is stated as rules of behaviour and 
how one actually chose to behave in reality.  
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In fact, employees of the Commission, such as Manuel Marin, seemed to have turned a 
blind eye to ECHO `s extensive use of “external” staff paid by operational funds. They 
did so not to enrich themselves or profit from this arrangement in any way. They did 
so to keep ECHO operative, helping people in need. Whether this is a desirable to a 
difficult situation is not my concern in this paper. I have chosen a descriptive path, and 
I simply describe what I see. There was a gap between the rules and the actual 
response taken. This created a double standard; the official rules on the one hand and 
the actual behaviour of the other. This contributed to what Mrs. Müller called a culture 
of mistrust. The mistrust was manifested in the EP `s lack of desire to release funds for 
ECHO `s projects.  
The situation was worsened by what Members of the European Parliament perceived 
as lack of transparency, that is lack of information from the Commission. There seem 
to be a discrepancy here also between the rules and actual behaviour. Parliament was 
entitled to and needed access to all the documents, as “ the one being examined must 
not decide on what it will be examined” as Mrs. Theato pointed out. In two cases in 
Process 2:ECHO; both concerning the use of “external” staff paid by operating funds 
and what Members of the European Parliament perceived of as lack of information, 
there is a breach of rules when the actual behaviour pattern is described. 
The actors do not always do as the rules states that they should do. In this sense my 
assumption that I would see rule and procedure following in Process number 2: ECHO 
must be modified. Rules were sometimes broken and this contributed to trigger 
Process number 3: A: A refusal to give discharge to the budget of 1996, 3: B Motion 
of Censures and then 3: C The Committee of Independent Experts. 
Still, looking through a Neo Institutional lens I detected something that perhaps is 
more important that whether the rules are actually followed or not. What happens if 
they are not followed? Does this have repercussions? The answer is yes. There are 
consequences for breaking rules. Someone is punished. 
The punishment did not however take the form of an individual punishment. Few were 
actually fired or punished otherwise personally.202 The punishment had an institutional 
character. Institutional units were punished. Instead of individuals, UCLAF was 
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planned reorganised, ECHO `s funds were frozen and no individual Commissioners 
were punished, they were disposed of as a College. 
As Mr. Santer pointed out himself, the correct response was not to impose sanctions on 
officials who commit these irregularities for the sole purpose of keeping departments 
running.203 As you can see there is also room for forgiveness manifested in the release 
of  ECHO `s funds. A return to rule following could be rewarded. (See 2.2.3. in 
Chapter 2). 
 
3.1.6. Commission Collegiality and EP Party System. 
  
Another striking feature noticeable through the Neo Institutional lens is that the two 
first processes, both in the UCLAF and the ECHO process, the Commission and the 
European Parliament acted as unified actors opposing one another. 
The image of the EP as a unified actor later evolves into an image of an institutional 
unit consisting of several fractions. As the EP Party System kicks in, the EP takes the 
form of a multiple fractioned unit with political division lines highly visible.  
The Commission on the other hand seems united under the shield of Collegiality. This 
is perhaps partially a result of rules stating that the Commission President could not 
remove individual Commissioners. This would support Neo Institutionalism 
statements about how rule affect the actor `s behaviour and what they decide. Rule 
could make the Commissioners loyal to the College as a whole even if they as 
individuals have different interests or other loyalties for example party loyalties. 
I have already mentioned the possibility that the Commissioners could have a party 
political background and a loyalty to a specific party. After all Mr. Santer is known for 
his background in the Social Christian Party of Luxembourg.204 So the Commissioners 
had a background from different political parties with different ideologies. Did this 
have an affect on the Commissioners loyalty and behaviour? 
I do not think so. I have found no evidence in any of the processes I have followed that 
suggests party loyalty or behaviour of any of the Commissioners. From a Neo 
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Institutional outlook it seems as if the Commissioners have had loyalty to one thing; 
the Commission as a College. In all of President Santer `s statements that I have 
looked into in Chapter 2, I find nothing but loyalty to the College. 
However, the EP might want the Commissioners to be influenced by Party Politics. 
This would strengthen EP `s position towards the Commission. In fact, this would 
constitute a development towards a parliamentary system. However, in my case I have 
found no evidence to support suggestions made about Party loyalties of 
Commissioners, only loyalty to their College. 
Nevertheless the EP did hold the Commission accountable and the Commission did 
resign. This could be an indicator of a parliamentary system on its way. This would 
mean more power to the Parliament and increase the supranational features of the EU. 
Therefore my assumption made in 1.4. Chapter 1 regarding increased autonomy is 
strengthened.  
 
Let us see if we can find other indications of a EU Party System. Can we find 
examples of EP Party Groups functioning as actors and were the MEPs act on their 
loyalty to their trans-national EP Party Group instead of their nationality?  
The Socialist Group in the EP launched a motion of censure against the Commission. 
Their objective was to restore confidence in the Commission, and reject their own 
proposal of censure.  
A spokesman of the Socialist Group stated that the situation had been improved; hence 
there was no need to censure the Commission. The PES seemed as a cohesive EP Party 
Group in this situation. There were no mixed signals from different MEPs in the 
Socialist Group, and Pauline Green seemed to genuinely speak on behalf of her Group 
when she stated that her Group had always been very active in the fight against fraud. 
She wondered why only Socialist Commissioners had been targeted. Later on she also 
implied that she questioned the motive of the criticism and implied that the motive was 
to undermine the Socialists and enhance other EP Party groups to improve their 
election results in the EP elections of June 1999.205  By doing so, she gave the 
impression that she was not only speaking on behalf of the PES Group, but more 
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importantly, she was defending socialists across the institutional units and across 
national division lines. She implied that Mr. Marin and Mrs. Cresson had a common 
interest, perhaps even a common identity with other Socialists in the European Union. 
It seemed as though a common political ideology could unite the Socialist 
Commissioners with the members of the PES, despite the fact that they came from 
different institutional units and despite the fact that they came from different nation 
states. Party politics seem to have brought Socialists together, meaning their behaviour 
could to a large extent be explained by party loyalty. (See 2.3. Process number3:A : A 
refusal to give discharge to the budget of 1996 in Chapter 2.) 
  
Also the Liberal Group (ELDR), the European Peoples Party (EPP), the Green Group 
(G) and the Union for Political Union (UPE) seemed united. They behaved rather 
cohesively, but all four of them opposed the Socialist Group. There was a slight 
difference between James Elles` statement were he listed points that the Commission 
should adopt like the establishment of an anti-fraud bureau and code of conducts and 
that of Wilfried Martens who argued that the Socialist Group were trying to conceal 
the responsibility of certain Commissioners.206  
According to Mr. Martens a plan on how and when to reform the Commission `s 
procedures was needed.207 I think there is a slight difference between these two 
statements, however the statements seem to be complementary and not opposing each 
other. All in all the EPP seemed united, even though different members stressed 
different factors as their reason of dismay. (See 2.4. Process number 3:B: Motion of 
Censures Chapter 2). 
 
All these EP Party Groups reminded the Socialist Group of the EP `s role as a 
watchdog over the Commission. Hence, it looks like they reminded Mrs. Green and 
her Group that her role as a MEP is not to support the Commission, but to hold them 
accountable. In this respect it seems as though Mr. Cox ` (Liberal), Mr. Elles ` (EPP), 
Mr. Boge `s (EPP) and Mr. Marten `s roles were dual.  
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Firstly, they behaved as a member of a political group opposing actions of a political 
rival Political Group. They opposed the Socialist Group and their support of the 
Socialist Commissioners Mr. Marin and Mrs. Cresson.  
Secondly, the Liberals and the European Peoples Party stressed their identity as 
Members of the European Parliament. They enhanced the role of the EP, and spoke as 
if their institutional unit (EP) had interests that did not coincide with that of the 
Commission. In their view (the representatives of both the Liberals and the EPP) 
individual Commissioners should be held accountable, and it is the role of the EP to 
hold them accountable. It seemed as though they tried to strengthen their institutional 
unit the European Parliament `s position towards the Commission. (See 2.4. Process 
number 3:B: Motion of Censures Chapter 2). 
The censure suggestions show us that the EP Party Groups sometimes succeed in 
behaving as a EP Party Group and sometimes not. From a Neo Institutional 
perspective this situation was a practical example were the Groups managed to stand 
together as a Group. This example gives support to the assumption of institutional 
units or EP Political Groups functioning as an actor other than nation states. It also 
gives support to the assumption that the actors’ behaviour is affected by their 
perception of identity and role as part of a political party. It also supports the 
assumption that these actors define their own interests and their work to increase their 
capacity to affect policy processes. It is an example of a Party System to be, and 
thereby a stronger European Parliament. 
 
Apart from EP Party Groups functioning as actors, there could be an even more 
important indicator of Party Politics. A Neo Institutional lens allows us to see there is a 
chance that the EP Party Groups formed alliances with other EP Party Groups on the 
same side on the left-right axis. If EP Party Groups were lined up according to a right 
–left axis, this would indicate that the EP Party Groups did not only act cohesively. 
The Party System was so advanced that right-left cleavage was an organising factor in  
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Process number 3 B: Motion of Censure which in turn triggered Process 3:C The 
Committee of Independent Experts and ultimately resulted in the Commissions 
resignation.208 
When the Socialist withdrew their motion of censure, they launched another idea; they 
demanded an investigation by an independent group of experts. Two other EP Party 
Groups backed the PES Group. That was the European Radical Alliance (ERA) and 
the Union of the European Left (UEL). 
The Radical Left is a result of national political parties that were formed as a response 
to the Russian Revolution and later the Independent Socialist parties that opposed the 
Social Democrats.209 These are to the left of the PES on the right-left axis, but they 
formed an alliance supporting the PES `demand for an independent investigation. 
I think this was an indication of a right-left axis that actually had an affect on MEPs 
behaviour in this motion of censure process.  
Evidently there were obstacles for such a right-left axis to take full effect. 
There was the matter of Europe of Nations (EN) who launched their own a motion of 
censure, which Mr. Fabre-Aubrespy called a “true motion of censure”. 
They did not seem to fit in on the left-right axis. 
In fact, some would say that they were an “anti-system” element, which did not care 
whether the EP or the EU functioned effectively. The reason why they formed a EP 
Party Group in the first place was to satisfy the EP `s own rules for finance and 
staffing, as explained earlier.210 Perhaps they are more easily identified on the 
supranational versus intergovernmental axis. 
There were further indications of an EP Party Group that did not follow the right – left 
axis. I am referring to the Green EP Party Group and its ambivalent behaviour. Even 
though the Greens seem to behave cohesively, they do not fit in on the right-left 
equation. 
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The Greens was an EP Party Group with a large German national delegation. It had a 
mixed ideology that consisted of environmental protection and pacifism with a radical 
agenda for reforming the European economic and political system.211 
They did not place themselves on the left side of the right-left axis as I suspected they 
would. They placed themselves right next to the EPP and the Liberal Group and 
supported their draft resolution demanding Edith Cresson and Manuel Marin `s 
resignation. Even though this suggestion was voted down, the fact that the Liberals, 
the EPP and the Greens formed an alliance does support the suggestion that the right- 
left axis explain how the party groups behaved in process number 3:B Motion of 
Censure, but also in the process leading towards the appointment of the Committee of 
Independent Experts. 
The motion of censures and the demand for an independent group of experts shows us 
that the EP party groups sometimes succeed in behaving as a unified group based on 
party loyalty, and that sometimes are able to form alliances on the right-left axis. It is 
an example of an evolving Party System, and thereby a stronger European Parliament. 
From a Neo Institutional perspective the policy processes number 3:B and 3:C were 
channelled through hands loyal to party politics, rather than loyalty to ones nationality.  
 
Apart from the EP Party Groups an institutional unit stood out from the rest as I looked 
through the Neo Institutional lens. The Conference of Presidents had for example 
given Herbert Bösch the assignment of writing a report about UCLAF that triggered 
the debate whether the Commission could handle its own problems. The Conference of 
Presidents also played an active role in the appointment of the members of the 
Committee of Independent Experts.212 Obviously, the appointment of the Committee 
of Independent Experts was not a way of doing things that everybody approved of.213 
The most frequent counter argument was that the Committees that already existed 
should be used instead of an independent committee of experts. Three Committees 
were suggested instead: EP `s Committee on Institutional Affairs, the Committee on 
Budgetary Control and the Committee of Enquiry. 
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The important things here are the procedures that the Conference of Presidents chose 
for appointing the Committee of Independent Experts. 
There was a majority in the EP for the founding of the Committee of Independent 
Experts. Still, the Conference of Presidents made an impact on what criteria the 
members should be picked by and finally the actual choice of members.  
The Conference of Presidents also stated what the report of the expert should contain 
and their mandate.214 
By the time it was made public who was picked as a member of the Committee, it 
seemed as though the differences were settled. It seems like the Conference of 
Presidents functioned as an arena for dispute settlement. The President of each EP 
Party Group seemed to have found a way to make it work, although Mr. Fabre-
Aubrespy from the Europe of Nations opposed the solutions made. He objected to the 
candidates who were selected because of what he saw as a marked commitment and 
political career which according to him could be a risk to the committee `s 
independence. Mrs. Green `s point was that the Committee of Independent Experts 
was needed to avoid “political party nomination”. (See 2.5. Process number 3:C: The 
Committee of Independent Experts Chapter 2). 
 
Mr. Gil-Robles (President of the EP) seemed to have been able to unite the EP Party 
Groups. They shared the costs of having the independent committee with the 
Commission. 
Still, the Conference of Presidents appears to be a body that manages to unite the 
different EP Party Groups and lay the premises on how to solve things.215 
They took important decision on how to handle the situation. They seemed to be able 
to represent the European Parliament towards the Commission and they seem to be 
able to stand their ground. Nation states were not involved at all in this issue. The 
appointment of the Committee of Independent Experts was a result of what the EP 
wanted and the procedures set by the Conference of Presidents. (See 3.1.3. The 
Conference of Presidents in Chapter 3.) The Committees of the EP was not used, but it 
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was the institution that chose how to deal with the situation. The Conference of 
Presidents functioned as an actor on behalf of the EP. Surely, this gives the process 
number 3:C Committee of Independent Experts an image of a Neo Institutionalism.  
 
3.2. Liberal Intergovernmentalism. 
 
Looking through a Liberal Intergovernmental lens the actors in the processes leading 
to the Commissions resignation are representing nation states or acting with the 
national interest at heart. National Party delegations from the Member States are not 
accepted as actors, once the national preferences are set. The National Party 
delegations, weak EP Party discipline and MEP `s national careers can sometimes 
destroy the cohesiveness of EP Party Groups and thereby trans - national party politics. 
From a Liberal Intergovernmental perspective the trans - national division lines are too 
weak to have any real affect on the decisions made. The national division lines are far 
stronger and people `s behaviour particularly in Process number 3:A Discharge of the 
budget of 1996, can be explained by national division lines and to peoples nationality. 
Reports are discussed in the Parliamentary committees, and there seem to be an aim in 
the European Parliament to settle disputes on the lowest level possible, meaning the 
EP Committees.216 If political issues addressed in a report is not settled there, the 
matter is discussed further in the EP Party Groups as a whole. This increases the risk 
of inconclusiveness. The more people discussing an issue, the more opinions there are 
on the matter. The more opinions there are, the more difficult it is to come to a 
conclusion for the EP Party Group. If the EP Party Groups do not have a cohesive 
conclusion, it is hard for the EP Party whip making the MEPs vote together as an EP 
Party Group. 
Lack of cohesiveness makes the EP Party Group weaker and its ability to take 
initiatives is weakened. This could also lead to chaotic and inconsistent decision-
making particularly if several EP Party Groups are indecisive. Thereby their ability to 
function as actions with an impact on policy processes is minimised.  
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In addition many of the reports are just read by the European Parliament committee 
members.217 The workload is so heavy that everybody cannot read everything. Their 
whip is their guidance for what to vote. The whip simplifies the decision – making 
process and guides the MEP through the jungle of information. There are limits to 
what the whip can do. Only a small proportion of votes are recorded, with the result 
that it is simply impossible to check how group members have voted. The whips 
therefore often see to attendance, but not what they actually vote.218 
Another important argument is that whips only work if the MEP sees their career 
within the EP on a long-term basis. If they think their national career is more 
important, they would be more concerned about not voting for things that would upset 
the national public219. 
One of the reasons why it is hard to make the MEPs loyal to their Group in the EP is 
that most of them begin their careers in national politics and naturally feels loyalty to 
the national party first of all.220 It is the national parties that chose the candidates and 
they also define the political issues and the arguments in the campaigns. 
Most MEPs do not see their membership in the EP as their most important career. 
Most of them already have a career in their own country. If they get a position in their 
nation state, they often leave their post as MEP. That is why they often only serve 3 ½ 
years of the total 5 years period.221 
Since many of the MEPs still hold positions in their nation state and often consider 
place in the EP as temporarily, they are interested in keeping their positions at home. It 
is important to them to be on their party `s national list as prominent as possible. They 
want the top positions on the party list.222  
It can be hard for them to come back to their nation state and explain their behaviour 
in the EP, if it is not in coherence with what their national parties want. The MEPs risk 
being reprimanded at home with a less prominent place on the national party list or 
maybe not be on the list at all. Since this is their chance of getting an elected position 
                                                 
217 Hix & Lord 1997:122 
218 Hix & Lord 1997:136 
219 Hix & Lord 1997:136 
220 Hix & Lord 1997:84 
221 Hix & Lord 1997:86 
222 Hix & Lord 1997:84-87 
 92
in a national parliament or local or regional government, this could have an impact on 
how the MEPs behave in the EP. 
 
The fact that the MEPs are recruited from national parties in Member States and the 
EP Party Groups do not have a recruiting system of their own and the fact that the 
MEPs do not stay long in EP makes Party Group loyalty in the EP harder.223 
The image of cohesive EP Party Groups is overrated.  Some of the national party 
delegations within the EP Party group can be quite dominating. A Liberal 
Intergovernmental outlook refutes the idea of national party delegations being actors 
after the national preference formation. Nevertheless it opens for the possibility that 
national party delegations can sometimes destroy the cohesiveness of EP Party Groups 
and thereby trans – national party politics. This opens up the possibility of MEPs 
voting along national division lines, meaning the Germans could vote together whether 
they are Socialists or Christian Democrats.  
Some national party delegations even meet in the third week when the EP Party 
Groups meet.224 They are eager to find out the exact details of reports so they can sort 
out whether the suggestions made in the reports will give them trouble in their nation 
state or not. They would also try to find possible trade-offs to get the deal through if 
that is what they want. Even the President of the EP Party Groups often asks the 
leaders of the national delegations what their position is.225 
These factors seem to underline the national division lines and blur the EP Party Group 
division line. Party politics becomes more blurred and nationality is brought out in the 
open. If the national party delegations do not dominate the MEPs, this creates more 
room for co-ordination amongst the EP Party Groups and thereby trans-national party 
politics. 
Though, there are limits to people `s loyalty to their EP Party Groups. 
As you can see efforts are being made to reach consensus within the EP Party Groups. 
If a national delegation has been outvoted in its EP Party Group, the national party 
delegation can decline to support the common line in the plenary vote. Being a 
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dissident from the EP Party Group is not always bad because they can form an alliance 
across the political divide to compensate for votes lost in their own camp.226It is 
possible to defect from ones EP Party line both for individuals and whole national 
delegations. This will be illustrated by an example from Chapter 2, process number 
3:A: Discharge of the budget for 1996, where the Committee on Budgetary Control 
(CoCobu) seem to have played a central role.  
Two political Groups are different from the rest by their effort to behave cohesively. 
Both the Green Group (G) and the Socialist Group (PES) had leaders, Mrs. Aelvoet 
(G) and Mrs. Green (PES) that declared that their Group would vote the same. The 
Greens would vote no to discharging the 1996 budget, the Socialist Group (PES) 
would vote yes. They announced that their intentions were to vote on the basis of their 
political Group across national boundaries. 
Nevertheless, it was not quite as easy as it seemed. 
Mrs. Green had problems keeping her group together and other socialists openly said 
that they would vote differently than the socialist official view. 
Klaus Hänsch (German PES) openly opposed Mrs. Green `s tactics, and said that the 
Commission should resign. He was not the only one who opposed Mrs. Green `s 
arguments to vote yes to discharge as a Group. (See 2.3. Process number 3:A: A 
refusal to give discharge for the 1996 budget Chapter 2) 
Rosemary Wemheur (German PES) was the Socialist Group spokesman in the 
Committee of Budgetary Control. Her tasks included articulating the groups` position 
in debates, coordinate the groups` activities and function as a whip, check the 
attendance of group members, find replacements if members that could not be present 
and negotiate with the other groups over which procedures to use in a specific 
situation. Rosemary Wemheur (German PES) resigned in protest at the Socialist Group 
`s refusal to support cross-Country moves to reject the 1996 budget.227  
The task as party whip must be particularly difficult when one disagrees with the party 
line, such as in Wemheur `s case. 
Who else were against giving the Commission discharge? 
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Diemund Theato (German EPP) the Cairman of the Committee of Budgetary Control 
strongly opposed giving discharge to the 1996 budget. 
What does these people have in common, apart from the fact of being against 
discharging the 1996 budget. The answer is their nationality. They are from Germany, 
but they are not from the same political group because Diemund Theato is a member 
of the European People Party and the others are Socialists. 
 Using Liberal Intergovernmental theory as a lens it seems as though Mr. Elles 
assessments were right. (See 2.3. Process number 3:A: A refusal to give discharge to 
the 1996 budget Chapter 2). The national boundaries were the division lines rather 
than the party lines. In the vote in the Committee of Budgetary Control the EP Political 
Groups were divided and not united. Both the EPP (Conservatives and Christian 
Democrats) and the ELDR (Liberals) were split down the middle.  
Even though strong efforts were made by the Socialist leader to vote as a group, this 
strategy seemed to fail in the vote on December 10 1998 in the Committee on 
Budgetary Control. National boundaries seemed more important to the MEPs than the 
Party lines. The actors involved acted according to their loyalty to their nation state. 
They voted as Germans, not as socialists. Still, it is important to take note of the fact 
that they were not representatives from their country `s foreign office, giving the 
official view of Germany as a nation state. Nonetheless, the image of national division 
line as the guidelines of behaviour is clear. The national division lines are enhanced 
further by the fact that neither the EPP nor ELDR were able to vote on the basis of EP 
Party lines. Loyalty to ones nation state does matter. National division lines seem to 
explain some of the MEP `s behaviour in the Committee of Budgetary Control in the 
matter of the budget of 1996. 
The reason for this is unclear. One of the reasons for some of the MEPs to vote as 
Germans and not as socialists is perhaps Germany `s extensive contributions to the EU 
budget. I would think that most Germans were highly aware of this fact and considered 
it to be in Germans interest that their contributions were handled well. In addition, this 
case was extensively covered in German newspapers. I think it is fair to assume that 
many Germans were better informed about the work in the EP committees than usual, 
because of information in German newspapers. Perhaps the MEPs with a German 
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nationality were anxious that they would be punished at home if they voted for 
discharging the budget of 1996. After all, it is likely that they would want a political 
career back in Germany. They would also need support from fellow Germans if they 
were to be re-nominated as a MEP candidate. 
 
Since the Presidency of the European Council alternates between the Member States it 
was Germany `s turn in the first half of 1999. This gave Germany the chance of 
influencing EU `s future strategies and Chancellor Schröder had a meeting with Mr. 
Santer about Germany `s role. First of all this gave Chancellor Schröder the 
opportunity to front Germany `s interests and preferences when sketching EU `s 
future. His visit also gave Schröder the chance of influencing German MEPs in the 
Socialist EP Party Group. 
Again the question of loyalty and national division lines versus party division lines 
came up. Chancellor Schröder was asked whether he would advise European Social-
Democrat MEPs not to vote on the motion of censure?  
He replied that he would not give such advice in public. As I looked through the 
Liberal Intergovernmental lens this left me with the impression that the socialist 
Chancellor Schröder was very perceptive of the idea of German Socialist MEPs. 
Chancellor Schröder looked familiar with the idea of the German Socialists operating 
as a group. This group was highly sensitive towards German national interests acting 
as Germans. (See 2.4. Process number 3:b: Motion of censures Chapter 2). 
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Chapter 4. 
4.1. Concluding arguments. 
 
I set out to explain the resignation of the Commission of the European Union as a 
result of process 1: the UCLAF process and process 2: the ECHO process that 
triggered the third process 3: A The refusal to give discharge to the 1996 budget, 3:B 
Motion of Censures and 3:C The Committee of Independent Experts, using Neo 
Institutional and Liberal Intergovernmental theories as conceptual lenses. 
These lenses led me to what data material to collect and functioned as pillars in my 
research design so that my conclusion matches my initial goal. 
The Commission `s resignation seemed at first glance a result of a series of actions all 
entangled. Making sense of this process was hard but as I structured my data material 
in time, using a timeline, certain factors seemed more important than others. These 
factors such as the missing ECHO funds and UCLAF `s investigation of the matter and 
alleged lack of independence seemed to escalate the decision not to give discharge to 
the 1996 budget, which later led to motion of censures and the establishment of the 
Committee of the Independent Experts. Ultimately this led to the Commissions 
resignation. However using Neo Institutional and Liberal Intergovernmental theories 
as lenses, would bring out different things in the process as a whole according to 
which lens I looked through.  
 
Looking through a Neo Institutional lens some things is clearer than others in 
explaining the Commissions resignation. The institution itself becomes important, 
specifically institutional units such as the Commission and the European Parliament. 
In fact the European Parliament and the Commission behave as actors, each with an 
agenda of their own. Both the Commission and the European Parliament seemed to 
want autonomy to realise their own interests. 
The Commission wanted to run its ECHO program and increased ECHO `s funds. 
External staffs were hired and their salaries were paid out of the operational budget, 
meaning money that was intended for food and medicine. At the same time money 
seemed to disappear without anyone being able to account for them. The Commission 
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found themselves in trouble and they wanted their own unit UCLAF to clean up the 
mess, thereby having more control with how the ECHO troubles were dealt with. But 
UCLAF had a sector-oriented structure that led to co-ordinating difficulties and a low 
degree of influence from Member States. The European Parliament and the Council of 
Ministers were unhappy about that and wanted UCLAF to be reorganised. The 
Commission `s response was to make the new OLAF totally independent against the 
wishes of the European Parliament. 
The European Parliament wanted a bigger influence on the policy processes that ran 
through the EU in general. They want to strengthen their own position visa the 
Commission, thereby shifting the power relationship in their favour.  
More specifically the European Parliament wanted the new OLAF to have a freer role 
but still connected to the Commission. They wanted to strengthen UCLAF and support 
them in their investigations of the Commissions programs such as their humanitarian 
aid programs dealt with by ECHO. 
The European Parliament realised that they needed an ally to strengthen UCLAF and 
so they turned to the Council of Ministers for assistance.  
The European Parliament got the assistance that they wanted and their preferences on 
how the new OLAF should be organised was met.    
Still, the European Parliaments confidence in the Commission was severely damaged 
and the European Parliament refused to accept the budget for 1996. 
Other actors emerged on to the arena. Neo Institutionalism allows us to see even 
smaller units such as EP Party Groups and rules like Majority voting and the Minimum 
demand of MEPs to form an EP Party Group. These rules worked as an incentive to 
the formation of these EP Party Groups and eventually allowed them to have a 
significant affect on the process leading to the Commission `s resignation. European 
Parliament Party Groups were acting on their loyalty to their trans-national European 
Parliament Party Group instead of their nationality. This comes to light in the Socialist 
`s launch of their motion of censure, a motion that was an attempt to restore the 
European Parliaments confidence in the Commission. The party identity becomes 
apparent when the leader of the socialist EP Party Group Pauline Green argues that 
only socialist were being targeted and that this is a scheme in a larger plan to 
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undermine socialists and to enhance the Liberals and the EPP in the coming EP 
elections June 1999. Party identity also is highly visible in the Green Group, the 
Liberal Group (ELDR) and the Conservative and Christian Democratic Group (EPP) 
response. All four of these groups reminded the Socialist Group of the European 
Parliament `s role as a watchdog over the Commission. Their job was to hold them 
accountable. In doing so they opposed a political rivalry group and underlined their 
identity as non- socialists and their identity as Members of the European Parliament. It 
is an example of people identifying with their EP Party Group and party lines effect on 
how they behaved. As a result the Party System grew stronger, and thereby the 
European Parliament.  
Apart from units such as EP Party Groups, there are units within the European 
Parliament such as the Conference of Presidents that grabbed hold of the situation and 
that had an effect on this process. The Conference of Presidents effect on the process 
becomes apparent in the appointment of the members of the Committee of 
Independent Experts. They took charge of the situation and excluded already existing 
EP Committees from writing the report. The Conference of Presidents had a decisive 
role in deciding who was going to be in this committee to begin with. Last but not 
least, they decided what the report of the Committee of Independent Experts should 
contain and their mandate. The Conference of Presidents managed to unite the EP 
Party Groups and behaved as an agent for the European Parliament. The Conference of 
Presidents gave the European Parliament a weapon creating the Committee of 
Independent Experts. A weapon the European Parliament used to inflict the fatal 
wound on the Commission.   
 
 
Looking through a Liberal Intergovernmental lens the actors in the processes leading 
to the Commission `s resignation are representing nation states or acting with the 
national interest at heart. National division lines are of paramount importance. 
National division lines overrides sector oriented structures and party division lines. 
Trans – national division lines are too weak to have any real affect on the decisions 
made. There are a series of reasons for this. 
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First of all there are flaws in how disputes are settled in the EP Committees. If the 
political issue is not solved there the matter is discussed further in the EP Party Group 
as a whole where the number of people discussing the issue is increased. Thereby the 
risk of inconclusiveness is increased and the EP Party Group `s ability to take 
initiatives are weakened. 
The EP Party Group whip has an extremely difficult job trying to make the MEPs vote 
together as an EP Party group with all this inconclusiveness. The votes are often not 
recorded, so the whip `s job is reduced down to checking attendance.  
The MEPs also value their carer in their nation state higher and they are therefore 
sensitive to what is going on in their nation state. After all they need their national 
party to re-nominate them and put them on their list both for national elections in their 
nation state, but also for another term as MEPs in the European Parliament.  
Another factor that diminishes the impact of EP Party Groups on policy processes is 
national party delegations. EP Party Groups are made up of different national party 
delegations. National party delegations are eager to find out whether there are policy 
issues that are decided on in an EP Committee that is disadvantageous to their nation 
state. Some national party delegations dominate their EP Party Group and the national 
division lines become more important. The national party delegations or individual 
MEPs can even decline to support the common line in the plenary vote. This can 
effectively ruin trans – national party politics. 
Looking through the Liberal Intergovernmental lens the failures of EP Party Groups in 
behaving cohesively becomes apparent. The trans – national party lines becomes less 
significant. What emerges are the national division lines, the strength of the national 
party delegations and the people `s personal perception of themselves as someone 
acting with their national interest at heart.  
What rises to the forefront is how national division lines played a decisive role in the 
European Parliaments Committee on Budgetary Control `s vote on whether or not to 
recommend discharge being given to the 1996 budget. 
The leader of PES Pauline Green stated that the socialist members in CoCobu would 
vote yes to give discharge to the 1996 budget. The German national delegation within 
the Party of European Socialists (PES) was powerful enough to have an impact on 
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their behaviour. More importantly the chairman Dietmund Theato (German EPP) also 
voted no. She was from the European Peoples Party (EPP). What these three people 
had in common is their nationality. They voted as Germans and national division lines 
guided them in their behaviour.  
The national division lines are enhanced further by the fact that neither the EPP nor 
ELDR were able to vote on the basis of EP Party lines. Loyalty to ones nation state 
and the possibility of being exposed to repercussions by ones fellow countrymen 
explains how these MEPs behaved. They risked not being nominated for important 
positions at home and not being re-nominated to be a MEPs. Above all they acted out 
of an understanding that this was not in the best interest of Germany `s tax-money and 
Germany `s best interest in general.  
Germany `s preferences were also important when Chancellor Schröder visited Mr. 
Santer and discussed the situation with him. Germany was to hold the Presidency of 
the European Council in the first half of 1999. Chancellor Schröder seemed highly 
aware of the fact that German socialists would be voting on a motion of censure. This 
trip gave him the opportunity to influence them and explain Germany `s official 
preferences to them. However he did not admit doing so in public. 
 
The story about how the Commission resigned is not however a story about how 
nation states preferences rules. Even though there are sides to this story that matches 
that of people acting with the national interests at heart and where national division 
lines turns the process in the Member State `s direction such as in the vote in CoCobu, 
the Commissions resignation can hardly be explained as the result of a Liberal 
Intergovernmental process. The process that eventually caused the Commission to 
resign is distinctly Neo Institutional. This is a story about an institution with a past that 
has implications for the future when mistakes dated back to 1992 had consequences 
for 1999.  
The rules, norms and institutional structures of the institution evolved through time 
and had an impact on the way people behaved in this process. The President of the 
Commission was prohibited from removing individual Commissioners, the MEPs 
formed and upheld EP Party Groups and the European Parliament `s Conference of 
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Presidents made the EP Party Groups come to an agreement on the Committee of 
Independent Experts based on norms and rules already in existence. 
This is a story about how people develop a shared identity by being within a specific 
institutional unit such as the European Parliament or the Commission, or by being in 
the same EP Party Group, and by going through the same learning experience. 
It is about how these learning experiences and these identities form different agendas 
on what is in their institutional units best interest and how people act accordingly. 
This is a story about a process were fraud investigations were basically led through 
structures that were sector oriented in UCLAF. When Member States got more 
influence over this fraud-investigating unit, it was because other institutional units 
such as the European Parliament requested this. The sector oriented structures and the 
party division lines take precedence over national division lines. Clearly this is a 
highly integrated system that takes hold of this process and pushes the process into the 
hands of institutional rules and EP Party Groups and leads the process away from the 
hands of nation states. This has consequences for the European Union as a whole. It 
means that the European union can no longer be described a tool in the hands of 
Member states. It means that the institution cannot be designed by Member States to 
fit their national preferences. The institution itself has an impact on what it is and what 
it will be. 
Therefore this case study has a wider meaning than just explaining the Commissions 
resignation as the end result of a Neo Institutional process. This is a case study were 
analytic generalisations can be made and were Neo Institutionalism gains support. This 
one case study supports the theoretical propositions outlined in Neo institutionalism 
and thereby strengthens it as a theory. When putting Neo Institutionalism to the test it 
comes out stronger than before.   
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